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 Drug courts represent one of the largest and most widespread criminal justice 
programs specifically developed to provide treatment and intensive supervision to drug-
involved offenders. Most of the literature about the effects of drug court programs 
involves individual-level analyses of recidivism or drug use for program participants. 
Very little is known about the broader community-wide impact of drug courts on public 
safety measures. The current research uses a subset of 63 drug court jurisdictions (cities 
and counties) drawn from a systematic review of drug court programs to assess the 
impact of program implementation on crime and arrest rates. A fixed-effects analysis was 
used to assess whether drug court implementation was associated with significant 
changes in specific types of violent and property crime rates. Changes in arrest rates for 
violent, property and drug crimes were also examined, and differential effects were 
 
explored based on effectiveness of the drug court in reducing participant recidivism and 
jurisdictional population size. Results indicate that drug courts are associated with 
decreases in overall crime rates, with marked decreases in burglary, property, and 
robbery rates. Drug court implementation was associated with increases in drug arrests 
and decreases in homicide arrests.  Small jurisdictions with average populations of less 
than 100,000 people were found to have a different pattern of results when measuring 
both crime and arrest rates.  These results are discussed within the context of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Drug court programs offer a holistic response to drug offenders’ needs that 
address the root of the problem (drug addiction) while offering support and monitoring. 
The first drug courts in the United States were implemented as a new, delineated strategy 
to manage high recidivism rates within the drug offender population during the “war on 
drugs” in the 1980s. Evaluations of individual drug court programs were conducted to 
determine whether the combination of intensive supervision and addiction treatment was 
better able to decrease recidivism rates within this offender population than the traditional 
incarcerative or probation strategies. Positive findings among the first drug court 
evaluations (Goldkamp and Weiland, 1993; Tauber, 1995; Broward County Commission 
Auditor’s Office, 1995; Department of Community Corrections, 1994; Deschenes, et al., 
1995) spurred the continued proliferation of drug court programs across the country. The 
body of drug court literature grew with the need for continued monitoring and evaluation 
of this popular new public policy.  
Based on two decades of research, drug courts are touted as the best way to 
reduce drug use and recidivism among drug-addicted offenders. “The effectiveness of 
Drug Courts is not a matter of conjecture…We know beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Drug Courts significantly reduce drug use and crime…” (NADCP, 2010: 1). The majority 
of studies of drug courts consist of evaluations of individual-level outcomes and meta-
analyses of these studies (e.g., Gottfredson et al., 2003; Mitchell, et al., 2012; Wilson, et 
al., 2006). These studies generally focus on process measures and reductions in drug 
court participants’ recidivism, while a handful have also looked at drug use and other 




methodologically weak, with few randomized studies and only a modest number of 
rigorous quasi-experimental studies (Mitchell, et al., 2012). 
Several meta-analyses of drug court evaluations find that drug courts are more 
effective for reducing recidivism among drug offenders than traditional probation 
processing. In a systematic review of 55 drug court evaluations, Wilson, Mitchell, and 
MacKenzie (2006) found that average reductions in recidivism were between 14 and 26% 
for drug courts over traditional probation. Similarly, in a systematic review of 154 
independent evaluations of drug courts, Mitchell and colleagues found that drug courts 
significantly reduce general and drug-related recidivism and that those effects appear to 
persist for at least three years. The authors relate the mean effect size as analogous to a 
drop in recidivism from 50% for non-participants to approximately 38% for participants 
(Mitchell, et al., 2012). Further, drug courts with high-fidelity program implementation 
(i.e., provide access to effective treatment and consistent intensive supervision) are much 
more effective, reducing recidivism over probation comparison groups by up to 40% 
(Shaffer, 2006; Lowenkamp, et al., 2005). 
Increasing public safety through reduction in drug crimes and drug use-related 
crimes is generally indicated as one of the primary goals of drug court programs. The 
National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) (2008: 2) includes as its first 
guiding principle that sentencing of drug offenders should “reduc[e] substance abuse and 
criminal recidivism and improv[e] the health and psychological functioning of 
individuals, their families and their communities” (emphasis added). Further, the 
NADCP (no date) states as its guiding mission that the expansion of drug courts is 




research brief indicates that the next big hurdle for drug court proliferation is to maintain 
fidelity of the program while expanding services to a larger proportion of the drug 
offender population (NADCP, 2010).  
This rationale follows a specific deterrence framework through the use of 
therapeutic jurisprudence (Wexler, 1993). One of the goals of the criminal justice system 
is to deter or prevent future crime out of the fear of legal punishment (Gibbs, 1975). The 
speculation that drug courts can reduce crime is rooted in the notion that drug courts, as a 
form of therapeutic jurisprudence, offer a legal punishment that reduces future offending 
for the population of drug offenders it is able to reach, thus reducing aggregate crime 
within the larger community.  
Since most drug court participants are generally drug-addicted offenders that are 
deemed likely to fail on standard supervision (Cooper, 1997; Tauber, 1998; Rossman et 
al., 2011), the drug court model directly impacts those that are likely to contribute to the 
crime and arrest rate. This rationale points specifically to a decrease in crime by reducing 
the likelihood that drug court participants will reoffend (specific deterrence), 
subsequently reducing the potential offender population. Scaling up drug courts to reach 
a larger proportion of the drug offender population should lead to measurable reductions 
in crime rates. 
The only evidence to date that supports this hypothesis is an extensive simulation 
study measuring the predicted benefits of offering drug treatment to all eligible drug 
offender populations. Bhati, Roman, and Chalfin (2008) estimate that approximately half 
(about 55,000) of the total eligible drug offender population (about 100,000) is being 




offenders eligible for drug court participation, only half of those eligible offenders are 
actually being supervised in drug court programs. The other drug offenders that are 
eligible to participate are not interested, capable, or otherwise able to get involved with 
drug court. The authors find that the benefit to cost ratio of expanding drug courts to meet 
the needs of all currently eligible offenders only fractionally reduces to 2.14 from 2.21. 
That is, expanding drug courts is costly but the benefits still outweigh the costs. This 
expansion in treatment translates to a benefit to society of over $1.17 billion. Bhati et al. 
(2008), however, caution that these estimates are based on simulated data and the true 
costs of drug courts going to scale are still unknown.  
Others assert that drug courts may have a public safety impact despite the 
relatively small proportion of drug offenders who actually receive services. It is possible 
that reducing the criminal behavior of a subset of the population may be strong enough to 
reduce specific types of crime in which these offenders are most likely to engage (Jeglic, 
Maile, & Calkins-Mercado, 2011). Another mechanism may involve strengthening 
informal social control by promoting sobriety, reducing the likelihood of criminal 
participation, and providing the means by which drug court participants can become 
positive members of their community. Positive community membership involves 
guardianship of property, active surveillance of youth behavior, contributing to the local 
economy, and strengthening social networks. By keeping drug offenders in the 
community the collateral consequences that may occur if such an offender were 
incarcerated can be avoided (Rose & Clear, 1998).  
The stated rationale through which drug courts might reduce community-wide 




regarding participation and the intensive nature of the drug court model limit drug court 
participation to a small proportion of drug offenders within a given jurisdiction. On 
average, they serve a relatively small proportion of the drug offending population, 
estimated at 5% or less (Belenko, 2002; Sevigny, et al., 2013). One central reason for this 
is that drug court eligibility criteria tend to be highly restrictive -- generally serving 
offenders that have no previous convictions for violent crimes (Franco, 2010). It logically 
follows that the impact of even the most effective drug court may not be potent enough to 
decrease crime rates community-wide.  
Although eligibility guidelines vary by state and local legislative decisions, the 
majority of adult drug courts do not allow the participation of violent offenders. The 
evidence also does not indicate that reducing drug use and abuse would have an impact 
on violent crime (Gottfredson, et al., 2008; Anglin and Perrochet, 1998; Johnson, et al., 
1985). Based on the offender population currently served by drug courts, there is no 
support for the expectation that participation would have an impact on violent crime.  
Finally, the effectiveness of the drug court program is likely to change if scaled-
up. The current focus of the NADCP is to broaden the reach of drug court programs to a 
larger census of participants (NADCP, 2010). This translates to broadening the scope of 
programming to provide services to more participants. Studies of scale-up efforts have 
shown that programs delivered on a smaller scale are generally more effective than when 
they are scaled up (Allen, Linnan, and Emmons, 2012). It is not currently known whether 
drug courts are able to maintain program fidelity while also expanding their reach. The 
NADCP (2010) argues that standardizing the best practices of drug courts so they can be 




field to address.   
The purpose of the current study is to broaden the spectrum of drug court 
evaluation to identify the impact of drug court implementation on public safety. While 
there is a large body of literature that supports the overall effectiveness of drug courts in 
reducing crime among the individuals who receive the program (Mitchell, et al., 2012), to 
date, only one study has examined the aggregate-level effects of drug courts on crime and 
public safety outcomes in the communities that implement these programs.  
 The current research compares crime trends across jurisdictions that have 
implemented drug courts. Specifically, jurisdictions with evaluated drug courts will be 
included in the analysis in order to leverage the variation in timing of drug court 
implementation relative to changes in outcomes. If other confounding factors can be 
ruled out, the “drug court effect” can be isolated as the likely cause in any changes in 
crime rates after implementation. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports reported crime and 
arrest files are used to identify changes in specific types of violent and property crimes 







CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
History of Drug Courts 
Addictive drug use has long been a considered a social problem that should be 
handled through the criminal justice system. The Nixon administration set the stage for 
the “war on drugs” with the establishment of the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) in the 1970s. Reagan fueled the war on drugs in the 1980s through decreased 
funding for treatment and increased funding for interdiction efforts in order to manage 
drug use and trade in America. The most stringent federal drug policies were enacted, 
including mandatory minimum sentences for possession and distribution and 
establishment of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. Arrests for 
drug offenses doubled as these legislative efforts solidified the criminal justice system as 
the means by which illicit drug use was to be controlled (Tiger, 2012). Never before had 
jails and prisons been dominated by individuals incarcerated for illicit drug use, abuse, 
and dependency.  
Specialized court responses to drug cases have historically been adopted as a 
response to increased arrests and crowded court dockets for drug crimes. The earliest 
form of specialized court intervention for drug cases began as a response to rising 
narcotics (e.g. heroin) cases in the mid-1950s caused by the introduction of mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws and increasingly strict drug laws. These laws, combined with 
more organized law enforcement strategies, dramatically increased the number of drug 
arrests. Chicago and New York were among the first to develop dedicated drug case 




dedicated court dockets were created to streamline drug cases as they moved through the 
criminal justice system. These efforts lacked standardization and offered few treatment 
resources to offenders, but they represent the first judicial attempts at addressing drug 
addiction (White and Gorman, 2000). 
The concentration on drug enforcement during the mid to late 1980s brought 
about the introduction of modern drug courts in the United States. Specifically, the 
Miami-Dade County drug court program began in 1989 as a response to the considerable 
growth in the drug-related caseload, strain on an already taxed criminal justice system, 
and perceptions of a negative impact of drug-related crime and criminals on public safety 
(Terry, 1999). These issues were not unique to Miami’s jurisdiction. By the late 1990s, 
there were 140 drug courts in operation and many more in the planning stages across the 
country (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997).  
Currently, over two decades after introduction to the American criminal justice 
system, there are nearly 3,000 drug courts operating throughout the United States 
(National Drug Court Resource Center, 2012). This proliferation is likely to continue, 
with the Obama administration nearly doubling federal funding for drug courts recently, 
from $25 million to $45 million through the Department of Justice (Tiger, 2012). It is 
clear that drug courts are established to be the drug control strategy of contemporary 
America. 
With the introduction of a professional organization for drug courts has come a 
concentrated effort to streamline the drug court model. The National Association of Drug 




identifies ten key components of drug court programs that are deemed necessary for the 
success of this type of intervention (NADCP, 1997): 
1. Integration of alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case 
processing. 
2. Use of a non-adversarial approach. 
3. Prompt identification and placement of eligible participants into the drug court 
program. 
4. Provides access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related treatment and 
rehabilitation services. 
5. Monitor abstinence by frequent alcohol and other drug testing. 
6. A coordinated strategy governs drug court responses to participants’ compliance. 
7. Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court participant. 
8. Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge 
effectiveness. 
9. Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective drug court planning, 
implementation, and operations. 
10. Forging partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and community-based 
organizations generates local support and enhances drug court effectiveness. 
 
These key components reflect expected court operations, drug court personnel 
cohesiveness, and collaboration with local communities. The ten key components are 
often used by researchers to gauge the effectiveness of individual drug courts, and are 
used to measure individual components of the drug court that impact outcomes. 
Almost half of the key components of drug courts dictate important court and 
treatment processes. Drug courts must consist of drug treatment and intensive supervision 
as core services provided to participants. Treatment services should be tailored to the 
needs of individuals and can include a variety of in-patient and outpatient drug treatment 
approaches, as well as cognitive behavioral programming. Intensive supervision includes 
frequent drug testing and ongoing judicial interaction that can be reduced as the 




identified as necessary features of any drug court; however, implementation strategies 
vary across drug courts. 
Several of the ten key components of drug courts note the importance of 
collaboration with all drug court stakeholders to ensure the successful operation of the 
drug court program. Drug courts use a non-adversarial team approach (e.g., judges, 
defense, prosecutor, treatment staff, probation, etc.) that identifies effective interventions 
while also ensuring advocacy for individual legal rights. This approach is aimed at 
ensuring compliance through effective rewards (i.e. positive reinforcement) for good 
progress and sanctions that try to correct behaviors that impede successful outcomes. 
Drug courts must have a strong relationship with local law enforcement agencies to 
support early identification of potential drug court participants and fast case processing. 
A short time between arrest, conviction, and placement into drug court is valuable to all 
drug court stakeholders in that it connects the drug crime with a rehabilitative criminal 
justice response for each individual offender. 
Finally, the NADCP (1997) identifies three key components that must be present 
to ensure the continued operation of drug courts within given local communities. Drug 
court professionals are encouraged to continually revisit “what works” in drug court 
programming to maintain and adjust programming based on effective intervention 
principles. Drug court evaluations for individual programs are not only required to 
maintain funding, but also offer insight into whether the process is being implemented as 
expected, and whether participant outcomes are favorable. To maintain support from 
local communities, drug courts are encouraged to forge relationships with community 




The sustainability of drug court programs within communities and over time 
depends upon long-term funding strategies. It is clear that the federal government is 
committed to the drug court model by providing seed money for almost all new drug 
courts and continued funding for courts that establish a need. The Federal Drug Court 
Discretionary Grant Program has appropriated over $530 million in funding for drug 
courts from 1995-2010, with authorization requests of $250 million a year in recent 
years. Under this program, drug courts can apply for federal funding of up to 75% of their 
operating costs and must establish a need for funding of a new drug court or 
improvement of an existing drug court. Other federal funding sources include funding 
from the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants (JAG), the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), and by the Department of Health 
and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA). It is unknown exactly how much each agency contributes to funding drug 
courts as they do not provide appropriations totals to that degree of detail (Franco, 2010). 
Though it is unclear exactly how many drug courts are funded with federal dollars each 
year, estimates indicate a large majority of drug court programs have used federal funds 
to implement and operate their program. 
State and local funding sources are often used to provide long-term sustainability 
and expand capacity beyond that which the federal grants allow (e.g., federal funding 
requires the exclusion of violent offenders), and to further solidify the court’s role in the 
community. Funding sources include state and local governments (through grants and/or 
fees), non-profit organizations, interagency partnerships, and community partnerships 




The Emergence of Drug Courts 
The institution of the first drug courts was rooted in a strategy to reduce 
recidivism of drug offenders that was believed to be more effective than traditional 
criminal justice processing for this offender population. The Department of Justice Drug 
Courts Program Office (2000: 1) explains that drug courts use “the coercive power of the 
court to force abstinence from drugs and alter behavior of substance-abusing offenders.” 
Drug courts integrate substance abuse treatment, sanctions, and incentives with case 
processing to manage nonviolent drug-involved offenders with a rehabilitative focus.  
Based on interviews with drug court advocates around the country, Tiger (2012) 
identifies three main reasons for the emergence of drug courts. First, drug courts address 
institutional problems in handling the problem of addiction, which is believed to motivate 
much criminal behavior. Second, Tiger (2012) finds that advocates refer to the “revolving 
door nature” of justice for drug offenders as the institutional failure that drug courts 
address. Instead of punishing addiction and treating drug use as a criminal act, drug 
courts treat addiction as a symptom of an illness and use the coercive nature of the 
criminal justice system to treat that illness. Finally, advocates describe a balanced 
philosophy of a tough and caring approach to rehabilitating drug offenders. Tiger (2012) 
indicates that the emergence of drug courts came out of a need for the judicial branch to 
reestablish its relevance. The stringent drug policies enacted in the 1980s removed most 
judicial discretion and replaced it with mandatory sentencing laws. Drug courts allow 
judicial authority to exert compassion for people through treatment while still 





This explanation of the impetus of drug courts in the United States aligns with 
what is known about effective ways to treat drug offenders within the criminal justice 
system. Tiger’s analysis of the emergence of drug courts indicates that drug courts came 
out of a renewed focus on the relationship between substance use and crime. This 
relationship is a topic of considerable interest and scholarship. The drug-crime 
connection is explored primarily by crime type to obtain a greater understanding of the 
types of crime in which drug offenders engage. This is of particular interest within the 
drug court context given the emphasis on public safety goals.  
Tiger’s (2012) second main reason for the emergence of drug courts lies in the 
drug court’s focus on addiction. Rather than continuing to focus on the efficiency of case 
processing for this high volume offender population, drug courts specifically address 
addiction as the primary focus of the program. Most drug courts embrace the disease 
model of addiction, utilizing the treatment and supervision resources of the program to 
support the offender in working toward sobriety (NADCP, 2010) 
Jellinek (2010) formally developed the disease model of addiction for alcohol in 
1960, though it has been adopted as a framework for drug addiction as well. The disease 
model brings addiction under the wing of medical science, leaving behind the notion that 
addiction was caused by a lack of moral character. Jellinek asserts that addiction is a 
diagnosable condition with characteristic symptoms (i.e., tolerance, withdrawal, loss of 
voluntary control) that can be controlled through abstinence and specialized medical 
treatment. Drug court programming uses this model by creating a support structure 
(intensive supervision) for abstinence and drug treatment focused on cognitive and 




 Finally, Tiger’s (2012) study indicates a shift in judicial authority that moves 
toward a therapeutic jurisprudence approach to handling drug offender cases. Mandatory 
minimums and other restrictions on judicial discretion block judges from carrying out 
justice in ways that they think might align better with judicial goals (i.e., reducing 
recidivism). The introduction of drug courts allows judges to refocus on the rehabilitative 
aspect of criminal justice. Wexler (1990) describes therapeutic jurisprudence as the study 
of the role of law as a therapeutic agent. Legal actors are social forces that can produce 
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences, and the primary focus of justice is to 
support rehabilitation of the offender. Drug courts allow judges to be a major stakeholder 
in decisions regarding the supervision and treatment of drug offenders participating in 
drug court programs (Burke, 2010). Pre-trial conferences are used as a way for the drug 
court team (treatment personnel, law enforcement, prosecution, defense attorneys, judge, 
probation officers) to talk about each participant and address any concerns with their 
rehabilitative goals.  
 Therapeutic jurisprudence is intimately tied to the concept of procedural justice. 
Procedural justice includes providing the offender with a voice or opportunity to tell their 
story, maintaining respectful relationships between legal actors and the offender, a 
trustworthy decision-making process, offender understanding of their rights, and 
perceptions that legal actors are interested in the offender’s personal challenges (Tyler, 
1990). Drug courts provide these elements of procedural justice and have been found to 
increase perceptions of procedural justice over traditional court processing (Frazer, 
2006). Further, drug court participants that have higher perceptions of procedural fairness 




 Overall, the rationale behind the emergence of drug courts firmly represents why 
they were so readily adopted throughout the nation. The timing was ripe in that the 
convergence of a high volume of drug offenders and a frustrated judicial authority fueled 
the adoption of non-traditional case processing for drug offenders. Within this context, 
the drug court program model makes “sense” for this offender population. It combines 
individualized supervision and treatment with a rehabilitative focus on addiction with 
specific goals to reduce drug use and crime. The program model incorporates theoretical 
jurisprudence and procedural justice to provide participants with a holistic rehabilitative 
program rooted in the criminal justice system. To this end, the drug court movement is 
considered the most influential criminal justice innovation in the American criminal 
justice system (Terry, 1999). A later section describes how implementation of a drug 
court may be able to provide increases in public safety through individual-level (i.e., 
specific deterrence) and community-level (i.e., procedural justice, informal social 
control) mechanisms.  
 
Linking Drug Use and Crime 
The drug court movement is rooted in the notion that there is a strong connection 
between drug use and criminal offending. Nurco, Kinlock, and Hanlon (1990) explain 
that there was a great interest in understanding the connection between drug addiction 
and criminal involvement from the 1920s to the 1970s, but researchers lacked the 
methodological rigor to fully root out the relationship between addiction and crime. 
During that time, the prevailing thought was that addicts were inherently criminal and 




since the 1970s identifies criminal involvement among drug users as a means by which 
individuals can support their addictive habit. Further, the highest frequency users are 
those that engage in the most crime and individuals commit more crime during periods of 
addiction than when they are sober (Nurco, et al., 1990). The types of crimes in which 
drug users engage is varied, but typically involves drug distribution crimes and property 
crime (i.e., income-generating crimes). Violent crime makes up a smaller proportion of 
crimes committed by drug users and the connection is often indirectly linked to drugs 
through drug-seeking activities (Nurco, et al., 1990). This evidence indicates that drug 
users engage in different types of crime and thus programs (like drug courts) designed to 
serve drug offenders can expect differential effects on specific types of crimes. The 
connection between drug use and violent, drug, and property crime is discussed below.  
In 1985, Paul Goldstein laid out a tripartite conceptual framework that outlines 
three explanatory mechanisms by which drug use might lead to violent crime, including 
psychopharmacological, economic-compulsive, and systemic. The 
psychopharmacological explanation posits that violence is due to direct, acute effects of a 
drug on a user. In other words, some individuals, as a result of short or long term 
ingestion of drugs, may become excitable, irrational, and exhibit violent behavior. The 
economic-compulsive explanation suggests that violence is often committed 
instrumentally while generating money to purchase drugs. Individuals who commit these 
instrumental crimes are not motivated by violent impulses per se, instead, violence results 
from some aspect of the social context such as the perpetrator's own nervousness, the 




Finally, the systemic explanation asserts that violence is an inherent part of illicit 
drug markets, e.g. drug disputes, turf battles, robberies of drug dealers and related violent 
retaliation. Since a substantial number of drug users become involved in drug distribution 
as their drug-using careers progress, they risk becoming perpetrators of systemic violence 
(Goldstein, 1985). Relatedly, Blumstein (2002) suggests a fourth connection between 
drug use and crime that concerns the community impacts of drug markets. Community 
disorganization caused by drug markets and their operation can influence the behaviors of 
others in the community not directly involved in the drug market. Drug sellers often carry 
firearms and this can compel others to arm themselves for defense or to settle disputes.   
While the Goldstein tripartite framework has been invaluable as an organizing 
scheme, it has had few direct and rigorous empirical tests (MacCoun, et al., 2003). 
Among the studies that have examined the framework, the dominant view is that 
psychopharmacological violence, as opposed to economic-compulsive or systemic, is 
rare, and that the social environment is a much more powerful contributor to the outcome 
of violent behavior (MacCoun, et al., 2003; Fagan, 1990; Parker and Auerhahn, 1998; 
White and Gorman, 2000). While there is some evidence to suggest that certain drugs, 
such as amphetamines, may increase violent crimes (Gelles, 1994), the vast majority of 
research supporting pharmacological effects is on the relationship between alcohol use 
and violence (Exum, 2002; Collins and Messerschmidt, 1993; Cuellar, Markowitz, and 
Libby, 2004). In several studies of drug users, researchers found that violent acquisitive 
crime (e.g., robbery) was avoided if non-violent alternatives existed (Johnson et al., 1985; 
Goldstein, 1985).  




of crime as compared to strictly violent crime (Gottfredson, et al., 2008; Anglin and 
Perrochet, 1998; Johnson, et al., 1985). For example, a recent survey of State prisoners 
found that 1 in 3 property offenders and 1 in 4 drug offenders reported drug money as a 
motive for their crime, as compared to only 10% of violent offenders (BJS, 2006). Using 
data from a larger study of the Baltimore City drug court, Gottfredson, et al. (2008) found 
that use of alcohol, heroin, and cocaine were related to increases in self-reported income-
generating crime but not violent crime. In a review of 25 years of research conducted at 
UCLA’s Drug Abuse Research Center, Anglin and Perrochet (1998) concluded that the 
commission of property crimes almost always increased to support dependence level 
abuse of drugs, including “hard” drugs such as heroin and crack on down to “soft” drugs 
such as marijuana. Similar studies of narcotic addicts found that individual property 
crime rates were significantly higher during periods of addiction versus non-addiction 
(Nurco, 1998; Harrison, 1992; Caulkins, et al, 1997). Additionally, a recent study of 
methamphetamine addicts reached similar conclusions: users’ drug spending was 
positively associated with earnings from both property crime and drug dealing (Wilkins 
and Sweetsur, 2010).  
The evidence regarding drug use and crime type informs the expectations for 
successful drug court programs. If drug courts were to be responsible for reductions in 
aggregate crime rates, it is most likely the impact would fall on rates for drug and 
property crimes. Reducing drug use for individual drug court participants is likely to 
reduce their engagement in drug crimes and the crimes associated with supporting those 
drug habits (e.g., drug distribution, burglary, larceny, theft, etc.). Since the proportion of 




committed by drug offenders is high, it is possible that successful drug courts may reduce 
violent crime rates but this reduction is likely to be small. 
 
Evaluations of Drug Courts 
The majority of the drug court literature consists of process and outcome 
evaluations of individual drug courts in the United States (Gottfredson, et al., 2003; 
Mitchell, et al., 2012; Wilson, et al., 2006). Periodic meta-analyses and systematic 
reviews have consistently found that drug court programs show a lower rate of recidivism 
than that of comparison groups; however most of the drug court literature is 
methodologically weak, with few randomized studies and only a small number of 
rigorous quasi-experimental studies (Mitchell, et al., 2012). 
In one of the few randomized tests of the effectiveness of drug courts, Gottfredson 
et al. (2003) found significant support for drug courts’ effect on recidivism. The study 
consisted of 235 high-risk offenders (i.e., those likely to continue substance use and 
criminal behavior based on risk assessment tools) in Baltimore, Maryland who were 
randomly assigned to drug court or traditional probation groups. The authors measured 
recidivism, offense history, treatment, supervision, and jail time over a 24-month follow 
up period. Gottfredson et al. found that the drug court group was significantly less likely 
than the control group to be arrested for a subsequent drug offense within a two-year 
follow-up period (40.6% vs. 54.2%). Additional analyses indicate that recidivism is 
lowest among those that participated in drug treatment and those that were engaged with 
intensive supervision (status hearings and regular drug testing) (Gottfredson, et al., 2006).  




for future drug crimes. A survival analysis indicates that though the drug court and 
control groups were rearrested at similar rates during the first four months of the 2 year 
follow-up period, the drug court group survived longer than the control group (Banks & 
Gottfredson, 2004). That is, drug court participants had a longer time to re-arrest than 
those who did not participate in the drug court. Further, participating in drug court 
significantly reduced the risk for re-arrest of a drug crime (but not violent or property 
crime) and indicated that once a person survived to a certain point, they were likely to 
continue to survive. The control group, however, remained at risk for re-arrest throughout 
the follow-up period.  
Other drug court evaluations report similar reductions in recidivism. An analysis 
of the Suffolk County drug court in Massachusetts found that drug court was more 
effective than traditional probation in reducing arrests, future incarceration, and parole 
suspensions and revocations (Rhodes, Kling, and Shively, 2006). Though a relatively 
new drug court program, the Adair/Casey Drug Court in Kentucky found that drug court 
participants had low recidivism rates (approximately 15%) during a one-year follow up 
(Havens and Cobb, 2006). Marchand, Waller, and Carey (2006a, 2006b) found in an 
analysis of the Kalamazoo County (Michigan) Adult Drug Treatment Court and the Barry 
County (Michigan) Adult Drug Court that drug court participants were significantly less 
likely to be arrested than a non-participating matched group during a 2-year follow up.  
In one of the few multi-site studies to examine the impact of drug courts on 
outcomes beyond recidivism, researchers from the Urban Institute, Research Triangle 
International, and the Center for Court Innovation collaborated on NIJ’s Multi-Site Adult 




of outcome variables including crime, drug use, socioeconomic outcomes, family 
functioning, and mental health (Rossman, et al., 2011). They found that drug court 
participants were significantly less likely to report committing crimes, and among those 
who did commit crime, committed fewer crimes than the comparison group. Results from 
official data showed that drug court participation reduced the probability of re-arrest over 
24 months (52% vs. 62%), but those results were not statistically significant. 
Additionally, drug court participants were significantly less likely than the comparison 
group to report using any type of drugs and less likely to report using “serious” drugs in 
the year prior to their 18-month follow-up.  
Periodic government assessments of drug court success have also been frequent in 
the drug court literature. In a 2001 review of 37 outcome evaluations, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that most evaluations report within-program 
recidivism reductions, especially for high-risk individuals. For example, 19% of high-risk 
individuals participating in a drug court program in California reoffended as compared to 
38% of individuals in a comparison group. Evaluations that isolate post-program (i.e. 
following completion of drug court and/or probation requirements) recidivism are not as 
common in the literature. Drug court participants, however, typically show lower 
recidivism rates than those in comparison groups. Post-program recidivism rates 
averaged 13% lower for drug court participants compared to individuals in comparison 
groups (Belenko, 2001).  
Two subsequent GAO reviews show similar findings. In 2005 a review of 27 drug 
court evaluations with clear outcome information and an acceptable evaluation design 




groups. Specifically, drug court participants show a 10 - 30% reduction in recidivism for 
felony and drug offenses compared to non-participants within a two-year follow-up 
period (GAO, 2005). The most recent GAO review includes data from 32 programs and 
shows a 6 – 26% reduction in recidivism for drug court participants over comparison 
group members. Re-arrest rates for drug court graduates were between 12% and 58% 
below those in the comparison group (GAO, 2011).  
More recent meta-analyses of drug court evaluations also conclude that drug 
courts are a better criminal justice response for drug offenders than traditional probation 
processing. In a systematic review of 55 drug court evaluations, Wilson, Mitchell, and 
MacKenzie (2006) found that average reductions in recidivism were between 14 and 26% 
for drug courts over traditional probation. In a systematic review of 154 independent 
evaluations of drug courts, Mitchell and colleagues found that drug courts significantly 
reduce general and drug-related recidivism and that those effects appear to persist for at 
least three years. The authors relate the mean effect size as analogous to a drop in 
recidivism from 50% for non-participants to approximately 38% for participants 
(Mitchell, et al., 2012).  
 Drug courts vary in their overall effectiveness in reducing recidivism for specific 
types of crimes. Gottfredson, et al. (2003) evaluated the effectiveness of the Baltimore 
City Adult Drug Treatment Court using a randomized-controlled trial. Results from that 
rigorous design indicate that the court functioned to significantly reduce recidivism for 
drug crimes when compared to traditional court processing (40.6% vs. 54.2%), and 
showed non-significant reductions in recidivism for property and violent crimes (25.5% 




evidence using information from 92 adult drug court evaluations. The authors found that 
drug courts reduced recidivism for drug crimes at a rate similar to what was found when 
measuring any recidivism, regardless of type of crime. Evidence from the MADCE also 
found drug court to be responsible for reductions in arrests for drug crimes (17% vs. 
22%), however these differences were not statistically significant (Rossman, et al., 2011). 
When investigating self-reported criminal behavior, Rossman, et al. (2011) did find that 
drug court participants reported significantly less involvement in drug possession, drug 
sales, DWI/DUI, and property crimes than those not involved in drug court programming. 
Taken together, the literature indicates drug courts are most likely to reduce recidivism 
for drug and property crimes. There is no strong evidence supporting an increased public 
safety benefit of implementing drug court to reduce violent crimes. 
There is considerable variability across courts in their effectiveness of reducing 
recidivism more than treatment as usual for drug offenders. Of the 92 adult drug court 
evaluations studied in Mitchell, et al. (2012), 41 (44.6 percent) had effect size estimates 
that either indicated no statistical difference between treatment and comparison group or 
favored the comparison group for recidivism reductions. The odds ratios ranged from 0.3 
to 24.4 (mean odds ratio = 1.66), with an odds ratio of 1 or below indicating no difference 
between groups or lower recidivism for the comparison group. Despite general success of 
drug courts in reducing recidivism, the magnitude of that reduction varies by a number of 
factors. Researchers have begun to explore this variability by investigating 
implementation quality. 
Drug courts share many common elements (described in a previous section) but 




An analysis of the 23 drug courts included in the MADCE found that though all of the 
courts were effective at reducing substance use and recidivism, the top-performing courts 
shared several common elements. These courts implemented multiple best practices (i.e., 
the 10 key components of drug court programs discussed above) including predictable 
and individualized sanctions, positive judicial attributes (i.e., actions and demeanor of 
judges towards clients that are respectful, fair, attentive, enthusiastic, 
consistent/predictable, caring, and knowledgeable) and participants that all entered post-
plea (Zweig, Lindquist, Downey, Roman, & Rossman, 2012). Less effective courts 
implemented fewer best practices or did not implement them with high fidelity. 
Drug court programs are expected to be most applicable to high-risk offenders. In 
this context, high-risk refers to offenders not likely to succeed on standard supervision 
and continue their criminogenic behavior (Marlowe, 2009). The structure of drug courts 
combine supervision, behavioral intervention, and treatment – all programmatic elements 
that are most applicable to high-risk populations (Andrews & Bonta, 2006). Researchers 
analyzing drug court outcomes by offender risk show the greatest effects for high-risk 
participants. Such participants had longer criminal histories, had a history of mental 
illness, and had previously failed less intensive criminal justice punishments 
(Lowenkamp et al., 2005; Festinger et al., 2002; Fielding et al., 2002; Marlowe et al., 
2006, 2007).  
The evidence for drug court effectiveness indicates that they are at the very least 
an improvement over traditional case processing for non-violent drug offender 
populations. Participants have lower rates of drug use and criminal behavior than those in 




offenders. Characteristics of drug courts that are best able to reduce substance use and 
recidivism are those that implement multiple best practices with high fidelity and serve 
higher-risk offender populations (Lowenkamp et al., 2005). As drug court expansion 
continues, and scale-up efforts are underway to broaden the reach of drug court services 
(NADCP, 2013), it is important to assess the aggregate impact drug courts may have on 
public safety within the communities in which these courts are housed. 
 
Drug Courts and Public Safety Outcomes: Theoretical Mechanisms 
 The stated goals of drug court include an interest in improving public safety 
within the communities in which the program operates (NADCP, 2008). Public safety is a 
broad term that often refers to agencies or policies that support the public in preventing 
and protecting from harmful instances such as crime. When relating public safety to 
crime, public safety is often measured based on incident levels of violent and property 
crimes, as well as self-reported crime. Focusing specifically on drug courts, goals related 
to improvements in public safety refer to individual-level and community-level changes. 
This review will discuss two mechanisms by which drug courts may improve public 
safety: through specific deterrence and broader community-wide change. 
The previous review of the drug-crime connection indicates that drug offenders 
are implicated in property, drug, and to a lesser extent violent crimes. The goal, then, is 
that introduction of a drug court within a community or jurisdiction will reduce the 





The NADCP’s argument that drug courts are capable of reducing drug use and 
crime may have merit based on the rationale that drug court programming targets high-
risk and high-need offenders. These are offenders with severe substance use disorders 
that are likely to fail in less intensive community supervision or rehabilitation programs 
(Marlowe, 2009). The principles of effective correctional intervention indicate that 
programs should be reserved for higher risk offenders as they have the most room for 
improvement and are arrested more frequently. Low risk offenders are less likely to 
reoffend and intensive interventions could detrimentally impact their lives (Cullen and 
Gendreau, 2000). Drug courts may be potent enough at reducing recidivism and drug use 
for high-risk drug court participants that this impact would be carried forward into the 
community by removing those offenders from the potential offender pool.  
Drug court programs are often characterized as excluding offenders that may be 
most applicable to the intensive programming model provided by this criminal justice 
intervention. The earliest drug courts necessarily concentrated on diverting offenders 
with drug possession charges into drug court so as not to appear “soft on crime” 
(Marlowe, 2012). A recent analysis of the potential impact of drug courts on prison and 
jail populations indicates that drug court eligibility criteria often exclude drug-involved 
individuals that are most likely to be incarcerated (Pollack, Reuter, & Sevigny, 2011). 
However, by 1998, 70% of drug court programs targeted individuals with extensive 
criminal histories and an average history of drug use of 15 years (Tauber, 1998). Further, 
an early survey of drug courts indicated most drug court participants have moderate to 
severe substance abuse histories (Cooper, 1997), and though they may not be able to 




non-violent offenders), the intent of the drug court model was to provide an alternative 
criminal justice program for offenders likely to fail on standard community supervision, 
not necessarily those likely to become incarcerated. This evidence indicates that drug 
courts may not serve a substantial portion of all high-risk offenders, but rather serve the 
subset of high-risk offenders most likely receive and fail standard community 
supervision.  
A survey of adult drug courts in 2004 indicates that drug courts have expanded to 
include other drug-involved offenders, focusing primarily on offenders with felony and 
misdemeanor forgery, property offenses, probation and parole violations, and prostitution 
charges in addition to felony and misdemeanor drug possession and sales charges. 
Almost all drug courts surveyed limit eligibility based on the offender’s criminal history 
with two thirds allowing nonviolent felonies as the most serious type of prior conviction 
permitted and about one-quarter of surveyed courts limiting prior convictions to 
nonviolent misdemeanors. Despite these restrictions, approximately 85% of drug courts 
do not have a limit on the maximum number of prior convictions allowed (Rossman et 
al., 2011). This snapshot of drug court programs indicates most eligible participants are 
drug-involved offenders with current drug or property crime felonies that have a criminal 
history involving nonviolent crime.  
It remains unclear whether drug courts as a whole summarily exclude high-risk 
offenders from participating. Rossman et al.’s (2011) snapshot of adult drug court 
programming included less than half of the adult drug court programs in the United States 
and did not provide a summative measure of average offender risk for recidivism. 




offenders offers information about the impact of excluding drug-involved violent 
offenders but does not fully inform whether drug courts are serving other high-risk 
offenders (Pollack et al., 2011; Sevigny et al., 2013). The potential for drug courts, 
serving limited caseloads of primarily nonviolent offenders, to reduce crime through 
specific deterrence hinges on making large changes for a small group of individuals 
engaged in frequent criminal behavior.  
Lipsey’s (2009) recent meta-analysis discussing the factors that characterize 
effective interventions with juvenile offenders indicates that targeting high-risk offenders 
is a major correlate of program effectiveness. Drug courts that target drug offenders at 
high risk for reoffending are most likely to effectively reduce crimes related to drug use 
and abuse by impacting those most likely to be responsible for those crimes.  
This type of specific deterrent effect at the population level has been 
demonstrated in other programs that target high-risk individuals. For example, Operation 
Ceasefire was originally developed in Boston to address gang activity and rising violent 
crime rates. It uses a focused deterrence strategy to increase the perceived certainty of 
arrest for those gang members engaging in violent behavior (i.e., high-risk youth). This 
strategy also focused on firearms traffickers in order to address the supply side of gun 
violence (Braga, et al., 2001). Using a basic one-group time-series design, Braga, et al. 
found that there was a 63% reduction in average monthly youth homicide victims (youth 
under age 24) and a 25% decrease in the monthly number of citywide gun assaults. It is 
not clear how much of the reduction was due to reduced behavior among targeted youth 
as opposed to among non-targeted youth who were deterred from committing crimes by 




There is also evidence that targeting drug-involved arrestees as they enter the 
criminal justice system can provide significant benefits to the community. An evaluation 
of Breaking the Cycle, a broad-scale drug court-like program aimed at felony arrestees 
involved with illicit drugs indicated that focusing resources on those in need of drug 
treatment at the pre-trial phase significantly reduced self-reported reoffending, jail 
overcrowding, received positive political support, and increased perceptions of public 
safety (Mitchell & Harrell, 2006). The program represents a focused effort on a specific 
sub-set of offenders (i.e., drug-involved arrestees) that was able to garner positive local 
change. 
 The evidence from these programs suggests that programs or policies aimed at 
reducing aggregate crime or prevalence rates are successful if they impact those at 
greatest risk for reoffending. It still may be the case, however, that drug courts are not 
capable of impacting public safety because they dilute their participant population with 
lower risk drug offenders and may actually contribute to increases in crimes given the 
interruption this program creates in the lives of low-risk offenders (Marlowe et al., 2006; 
Festinger et al., 2002).  
It is often argued that drug courts do not serve a large enough proportion of the 
high-risk population they are designed to serve. Bhati et al. (2008) estimate that, 
nationally, drug courts serve approximately half of the potentially eligible drug-involved 
offenders the program aims to impact. However, this analysis does not further restrict the 
potential drug court participant population to offenders with diagnosed substance use 
disorder – the population drug courts were designed to serve (Marlowe, 2012). Rossman 




responding to the survey, about 46% indicated their courts had less than 50 active 
participants. In terms of case flow, the drug courts averaged about 90 new admissions in 
the surveyed year, and most operated at or above capacity.  
The survey also asked courts about admissions criteria based on substance use. 
Approximately 38 percent of the surveyed courts limited participation only to those with 
diagnosed substance use disorders, with the rest of the courts additionally allowing 
frequent users (33%) and anyone who uses illegal drugs (29%). This evidence indicates 
that courts attempt to concentrate on offenders with substance use disorders, but some 
unknown proportion of participants are drug users without a substance use disorder 
(Rossman et al., 2011).  
The national proportion of offenders with treatment needs that drug courts serve 
can be roughly estimated using active participant totals from Rossman et al.’s survey of 
drug court programs in 2003, the 2003 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) arrest information, 
and the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program (ADAM) data from 2003. The ADAM 
data estimates the proportion of arrestees that are drug-involved and at risk for drug 
dependence through urinalysis and self-reported behavior. The 2003 ADAM data include 
a sample of 39 counties and indicates 67% of arrestees in the sample tested positive for 
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamines, opiates, or phencyclidine (PCP). Approximately 
39% of arrestees indicated they were at risk for drug dependence, an indication for the 
need for drug treatment (Zhang, 2003). Using UCR information, this translates to 
approximately 5.3 million arrestees (Snyder, 2012).  
According to Rossman et al.’s (2011) survey of drug courts, almost half of drug 




participants in 2003. On average, the surveyed drug courts admitted 89 participants in the 
previous year, which translates to about 135,102 people if multiplied to cover the 
approximate number of adult drug court programs in the nation (1,518). Conservatively, 
this represents 2.5% of the population of arrestees with substance use disorders in the 
United States, an admittedly small proportion of the population drug courts are intended 
to serve. However, this total is a national representation, including a large majority of 
areas that do not have drug courts within their jurisdiction and masking jurisdiction 
variation in drug court size and the drug-involved arrestees they are designed to serve. 
The only conclusion that can be derived from this rough analysis is that drug courts do 
not serve a large proportion of arrestees with substance use disorders nationwide. 
A more focused way to estimate the proportion of drug-involved offenders drug 
courts serve is to estimate the totals within drug court jurisdictions. For example, Denver, 
CO and Hennepin County, MN are jurisdictions that are included in both the ADAM data 
for 2003 and the sample of drug court jurisdictions in the current analysis. The ADAM 
data indicate that 31.5% and 32.3% of arrestees in Denver and Hennepin County 
(respectively) are in need of drug treatment. Based on admissions information from 
Denver and Hennepin County (approximately 478 and 584 admissions per year, 
respectively), it is estimated that these two jurisdictions serve 59% and 52.6% of 
offenders with substance use disorders each year.
1
 If the inclusion criteria were expanded 
to any arrestee testing positive for drugs, it is estimated that the drug courts serve 18.5% 
and 17% of drug-involved arrestees. Though this estimate does not represent a definitive 
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 Evaluators for the Madison County, IL drug court estimated the share of drug-involved offenders 
admitted to the drug court during the first two years of operation (Godley et al., 1998). They estimated the 
drug court reaches 49% of drug-involved offenders within the county, a comparable proportion to the 




conclusion about the proportion of drug-involved offenders drug courts may serve, it 
indicates that drug courts may include a large proportion of offenders with substance use 
disorders within the jurisdictions they serve. 
A second mechanism by which drug courts can impact public safety is through 
community-wide change. Effective drug courts could start a ripple effect given the 
peripheral outcomes drug courts may support, such as reductions in drug market activity, 
reducing incidence of generational detriments (e.g., fewer babies born in disadvantaged 
environments), and increases in positive social support mechanisms within the 
community. Drug court participants that achieve successful outcomes (sobriety and 
reduced recidivism) may be more capable of participating as a positive member of the 
community by being more active family members, economic consumers and producers, 
and work in partnership with their neighbors to benefit the community. 
A comprehensive analysis of the social impacts of drug court was estimated in the 
Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE). Net benefits to society during the 18-
month follow-up period were estimated and include social productivity (e.g., employment 
and education), criminal justice system (e.g., police, courts), crime and victimization, 
service use (e.g., drug, medical, and mental health treatment), and financial support use 
(e.g., government, friends and family). The authors found that the net benefit of drug 
court participation is nearly $6,000 per offender, a cost-benefit ratio of 1.92:1 (Rossman, 
Rempel, Roman, Zweig, et al., 2011). Similarly, the Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy estimates a 1.74:1 cost-benefit ratio of drug court programs (WSIPP, 2003). 
Though not a direct measure of improvements in the social fabric of the community, 




Few drug court evaluations have directly explored peripheral effects of drug 
court. Evaluation of the Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court included interviews of 
drug court participants and control group members to assess differences in crime 
participation, drug addiction, employment, physical and mental health, and family and 
social indicators. Drug court participants were found to be significantly less likely to be 
on welfare three years after participation as compared to the randomized control group 
members that were interviewed (Gottfredson, Kearley, Najaka, & Rocha, 2005). Green 
and Rempel (2012) use information from the MADCE to assess whether drug courts 
significantly impacted socioeconomic well-being (e.g., employment, education, financial 
assistance needs), family relationships, mental health, and homelessness 18 months after 
participation. The authors found that drug court participants had more favorable 
outcomes (e.g., less reliance on public financial assistance, higher annual income, 
stronger mental health) but they were not statistically significant. Drug court participants 
were, however, significantly more likely to have less family conflict and stronger family 
emotional support.   
Further support for possible community-wide impacts of drug court is focused on 
prison diversion. Drug court participants remain in the community rather than going to 
prison. Incarcerating drug-involved offenders creates barriers to drug treatment (Mauer & 
King, 2007) and exposes them to an environment that can be mildly criminogenic (Nagin, 
2009). These effects are compounded when offenders face reentry barriers when released 
back into the community. Reentry barriers include negotiating family and social ties that 
were disrupted during incarceration and strained upon return to the community (Rose & 




consequences of incarceration by allowing offenders to remain in the community and 
offering them resources to promote sobriety, encourage employment, and strengthen 
social connections through drug treatment and intensive court supervision. 
 
Drug Courts and Public Safety Outcomes: Existing Research 
 To date, there is only one published analysis of the impact of drug courts on 
jurisdiction-level outcomes. Lilley (2013) uses nationwide data from 1995 to 2002 to 
assess the impacts of drug court implementation grants on felony violent and property 
offenses in over 5,000 jurisdictions. The time span used in this analysis represents the 
impact of the early drug courts in a time during which the majority of drug court 
participants did not successfully complete the program. Lilley uses drug court 
implementation grants to represent the timing of drug courts within jurisdictions (lagged 
1 year to allow for programmatic effects to accumulate). Other justice grants (COPS, 
Weed and Seed, State Criminal Alien Assistance, and Local Law Enforcement Block 
grants) are also controlled in the analysis in order to try to isolate the drug court 
implementation grant as the key indicator for changes in violent and property crime. 
Other control variables represent time-varying demographics that differ across 
jurisdictions (percent nonwhite, percent age 15-24, per capita income, and employment 
rate). These variables are included because they can impact both the independent variable 
of interest (drug court implementation) and the dependent variables (property and violent 
crime rates). Lilley uses a fixed effects modeling strategy to rule out time-invariant 
characteristics of jurisdictions (e.g., region, jurisdiction size, type of government) and 




 Lilley (2013) found that drug court implementation grant funding was associated 
with net increases in felony violent and property crime with the exception of murder. 
This relationship was most robust for vehicle theft, finding that a 10 percent increase in 
drug court grant funding was associated with approximately 13 additional vehicle thefts 
per 100,000 people. The author found that among the measured justice grants, drug court 
grants were the only funding sources associated with increased crime rates while all the 
others were associated with decreases in crime. This indicates that the relationship 
between drug court grants and crime rates is not due to an interaction with other justice 
grant funding. The author tested an alternative model isolating just the drug court 
jurisdictions in order to rule out the possibility that the drug court jurisdictions were 
different in some fundamental way from jurisdictions without a drug court. Overall, 
Lilley (2013) found that the positive relationship between drug court implementation and 
property offenses was more consistent than the relationship between implementation and 
violent offenses. The author argues that the finding is likely due to the low graduation 
rate of the early drug courts, which made up a large proportion of the sample of drug 
court jurisdictions. These courts experienced high non-completion rates where 
participants who either “failed out” of drug court or opted not to continue were placed on 
community supervision (or given no supervision at all) rather than sent to jail or prison.  
 Lilley’s analysis of drug court implementation and crime rates represents a first 
step in understanding the community-level impacts of drug court programs. However, 
this evidence needs to be taken further to identify the potential reasons for the 
relationship the author found, especially since drug court implementation was found to be 




evaluation literature would indicate. Further, Lilley does not provide information about 
the effect of drug court implementation on jurisdictional drug crime participation. 
Though the author tested many different alternative models to identify the robustness of 
the effect, this evidence lacks information about the quality of the drug court programs 
funded through the implementation grants. Drug courts vary widely in their 
implementation fidelity, especially the early drug court models. Further evidence is 
required in order to accurately assess whether the effects of well-implemented and 
effective drug court programs differ from the effects of drug courts evaluated to be 
ineffective at reducing recidivism. 
 
Research Question 
The goal of the current research is to explore whether drug courts can impact 
public safety. The guiding research question asks whether the introduction of a drug court 
within a jurisdiction is responsible for significant changes in specific types of reported 
violent and property crime. Arrest information (drug arrests and specific types of arrests 
for property and violent crimes) is also used to measure the relationship between drug 
court and public safety. Though drug court advocates, critics, and researchers have all 
weighed in on the potential for drug courts to achieve this goal, the direct impact of drug 
court programs on public safety remains largely unmeasured. The specific data and 







CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 The impact of drug courts on public safety was measured by collecting yearly 
reported crime from 1990 to 2008 for jurisdictions with drug courts evaluated in a recent 
meta-analysis. A list of evaluated drug courts with varying effectiveness was compiled 
based on the studies reviewed in the Mitchell, et al. (2012) systematic review of drug 
court programs. 2 The implementation date for each drug court was identified by 
searching information provided within evaluation reports, using administrative 
documents available to the public, or by contacting drug court coordinators. Yearly 
reported crime and arrest data for each of the drug court locations is available from the 
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports master files.  
A panel fixed effects model is used to analyze jurisdiction-year panel data. This 
method leverages the variation in timing of drug court implementation relative to changes 
in reported crime. That is, this model is capable of determining if changes in the 
dependent variables (specific types of violent and property crimes) coincide with the 
introduction of the drug court.  
 
Data Sources 
 The current research uses several data sources to determine the impact drug courts 
have on public safety within a community (Table 1). For the purposes of this study, 
“community,” “location,” and “jurisdiction” all refer to either cities or counties. The 
sample of drug court locations and their effectiveness has been garnered from the list of 
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 A sensitivity analysis of differences between effective and ineffective drug courts, based on their effect 
sizes in the Mitchell et al. (2012) meta-analysis was originally intended for this study.  There was a lack of 
variability between “effective” and “ineffective” drug court programs that prevented a meaningful 
comparison by type of court.  That is, the ineffective courts were not different enough from the effective 




studies included in Mitchell’s, et al. (2012) systematic review of adult drug court 
programs. The authors include in their review 92 studies of drug court programs in the 
United States, Canada, and Australia. Locations were excluded from the current analysis 
if they were outside the United States, or were calculated as part of a pooled location 
sample (as with the Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation). For example, six studies 
included multiple locations and thus are excluded from the current analysis since it is 
unclear from the pooled effect size whether the sites included in each of those studies 
varied by individual court effectiveness. Three other locations (Bronx, Brooklyn, and 
Queens County, New York) were excluded because their crime information was 
combined with other locations and reported to the FBI by a larger state agency. The 
resulting sample represents 30 states and includes 63 unique locations (Table 2)
3
. There 
are 54 counties and 9 cities represented in these data.   
The second data source included in the current research is yearly crime and arrest 
rates (per 100,000 people). The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports master reported crimes file 
(Return A) and the master arrest file include crime counts for specific types of violent 
and property crimes and arrest counts for specific types of violent, property, and drug 
arrests. These data begin one year prior to the earliest drug court implementation year and 
end 3 years after the most recent drug court implementation year to create a balanced data 
set across all included jurisdictions (1990 – 2008). The reported crimes data file includes 
four types of violent crime and three types of property crime. Though all crime types are 
explored, research regarding the relationship between drugs and crime indicates that the 
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 Originally, this sample included one other jurisdiction, Miami-Dade, Florida and included the years 1986 
to 2008.  Investigation of the dependent variable information revealed substantial missing data in the late 
1980s, primarily due to non-reports for the entire state of Florida in 1988.  To minimize threats to validity, 
the time period was constrained to include the years 1990-2008.  Since Miami-Dade’s drug court was 




property crimes included in this analysis (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) are 
the most likely to be impacted by drug court implementation (Nurco, et al., 1990). 
Violent crime impacts are also explored, with changes in robbery and assaults more 
directly linked to drug offenders than homicide or rape because robbery and assault are 
more directly implicated as violent actions associated with drug markets (Blumstein, 
2002).  
Dependent variables for violent and property arrests are offered as a sensitivity 
test to investigate differences with the reported crimes file. The current analysis uses 
reported crimes as the main dependent variables as it provides a better connection to 
assessing whether public safety is related to drug court implementation. Measuring public 
safety via arrest is not as directly linked to the relationship of interest because arrest only 
counts police encounters with criminal suspects and therefore excludes crimes committed 
but for which there is no suspect captured (e.g., a reported burglary that does not result in 
apprehension). Since the reported crimes file does not measure drug activity, and the 
analysis concerns criminal justice services provided to drug-involved offenders, the UCR 
master arrest file is used as a proxy to measure community-wide changes in drug crimes 
with drug arrest information.  
The master arrest file includes arrest for the same types of violent and property 
crimes as are available in the master reported crimes file, with the addition of arrests 
involving weapons charges, arson, forgery or fraud, embezzlement, buying or receiving 
stolen property, vandalism, and sex crimes other than rape (e.g., prostitution). The master 
arrest file also includes arrest counts for sale or possession of illegal drugs, with some 




marijuana, opiates, other narcotics, and dangerous non-narcotics). Finally, this file 
includes arrest counts for various other crimes such as gambling, vagrancy law violations, 
drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and driving under the influence. Arrests for homicide, 
rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, vehicle theft, and total drug crimes (with and 
without marijuana) are analyzed in the current study to offer direct comparison to the 
investigation of the reported crimes file, with the addition of drug arrests. The other types 
of crime found in the master arrest file are not as consistently reported and suffer from 
low values conflating true zeros with zeros due to non-reporting of those specific crime 
types.  
Both sets of dependent variables were converted to rates in order to standardize 
across jurisdictions of different sizes. The UCR crime and arrest counts for each 
jurisdiction and year were divided by the jurisdiction population for the corresponding 
year and then multiplied by 100,000. This result converts the dependent variables to 
crimes and arrests per 100,000 people. Arrest information for violent and property crimes 
is used as dependent variables for the purposes of offering a sensitivity test of the main 
research question. This investigates whether the impact of drug court implementation 
differs based on whether reported crimes or arrests are measured. In this analysis, drug 
arrests serve as a proxy for drug market activity within the sample and whether this 
activity changes when drug courts are implemented. Other sensitivity analyses are 
conducted to investigate whether the inclusion or exclusion of certain types of drugs (e.g., 
marijuana) changes the pattern of results. 
For multi-agency jurisdictions (e.g., counties), data from “zero-population 




enforcement agencies within these populations (Maltz, 1999). These agencies include 
state police, campus, airport, and other special police agencies. Data for partial and non-
reporting agencies were imputed based on the FBI’s imputation strategy. More details 
regarding missingness within the data are presented in the next chapter. 
The third data source involves information gathered from each of the drug court 
programs. Drug court documents, evaluations, or personal correspondence are used to 
identify the year each drug court began providing services to drug offenders and the year 
the drug court stopped providing services if applicable.  
Finally, data regarding the time-variant control variables was collected to measure 
demographic characteristics of the locations that have the potential to change over the 
time span. Jurisdiction-specific characteristics vary over time and may be directly linked 
to the dependent variables: proportion of 15-24 year olds in the population, percent non-
white, per capita income, and the employment rate. Data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (per capita income), the US Census Bureau (percent 15-24 year olds and percent 
non-white), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rate) all provide annual 
information about the jurisdictional demographics of interest in this analysis.  
These demographic controls are used in all analysis of the dependent variables 
because they are important correlates of crime (Zimring, 2008; Blumstein & Wallman, 
2000). Specifically, the age-crime curve indicates that young people engage in crime 
more frequently than older adults and thus increases in the proportion of young people 
(ages 15-24) within jurisdictional populations would affect increases in crime. Race is 
also a demographic correlate of crimes wherein people of color come into contact with 




to fluctuations in crime, though the mechanisms by which this connection occurs are not 
fully developed. Unemployment rates and personal income represent economic forces 
that may provide opportunity and incentive to participate in income-generating crimes as 
well as provide opportunities for violent crimes either as perpetrators or victims. Chapter 
4 investigates each of these control variables to identify whether they vary significantly 
over the time period of interest. Though they are all important correlates of crime, it is 
only necessary to control for jurisdiction-specific time-variant correlates of the dependent 
variable as the fixed effects absorb time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
 A panel model using fixed effects is used to answer both the primary research 
question and in the sensitivity analyses. Specifically, this analysis estimates whether 
implementing a drug court is related to changes in crime rates. A fixed effects model is 
used to identify the effect drug court implementation has on changes in crime (lagged 2 
years). The rationale for lagging two years follows with many other studies of policy 
effects on crime (e.g., Lilley & Boba, 2009; Lilley, 2013; Zhao, Scheider, & Thurman, 
2002). Since drug court programming usually lasts at least one year, lagging two years 
takes into account the expected delayed effects of implementing the program. The fixed 
effects approach controls for differences across locations in time-invariant predictors, 
which reduces omitted variable bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The strength of this 
approach is that the model is not biased by omitted time-invariant characteristics of each 
of the drug court locations. The model coefficient, after controlling for time-variant 




court implementation) by controlling for much of the unique unobserved characteristics 
of each drug court location. The equation for this estimation is as follows: 
(1)  𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 The dependent variable, lnCrimeit refers to each of the dependent variables: 
reported crime and arrest rates for homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, 
motor vehicle theft, and arrest rates for drug crimes. The natural log of all dependent 
variables was used to normalize the error terms in the models. Crime is defined as a rate 
representing the number of actual offenses that were reported in the jurisdiction for the 
year in question, excluding unfounded, false, or baseless complaints. Arrest refers to the 
number of people formally taken into custody as an arrest by police. 𝛽1 represents the 
coefficient for the independent variable of interest: the two year lagged implementation 
year for each drug court location. This variable is equal to 0 during the years the drug 
court was not operating and turns to 1 the second year after it is implemented (and stays 1 
for all years in which it operates) for each jurisdiction. 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents time-variant 
control variables that may confound the drug court-crime relationship. Jurisdiction 
specific characteristics may vary over time and may be directly linked to the dependent 
variables: percent of the population aged 15-24 years old, percent non-white, per capita 
income, and employment rate. These controls may appear more time-invariant in shorter 
time spans, however, the current analysis includes data spanning 19 years, increasing the 
likelihood that these characteristics would change enough to make it necessary to control 
for them in the fixed effects model. The two fixed effects terms, jurisdictioni and yeart 
account for time-invariant unobserved differences across jurisdictions (e.g., geographic 




time that affected all jurisdictions (e.g., the general downward trend in crime over the 
time span). Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the remaining unobserved error for each jurisdiction 
and year.  
 Equation 1 will also be used in independent-sample sensitivity tests. Once 
estimated, a statistical test of the differences between the 𝛽1 coefficient estimates will be 
performed to determine whether the effect of drug courts on public safety differs by 
altering the sample. For example, the outlier analysis presented in Chapter 4 necessitates 
a test of independent sample differences to fully understand the implications of removing 
outliers from the main analysis. Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998) note 
inconsistencies with the proper estimation of regression coefficient differences found 
within criminological literature. Based on their findings, Equation 2 will be used to 
determine whether the two coefficients statistically differ by considering the difference 







The current research tests whether adult drug court implementation is related to 
changes in specific types of reported crimes (homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, 
larceny, and motor vehicle theft) using 63 county and city jurisdictions over a 19-year 
panel. A secondary test measures whether this effect differs based on specific jurisdiction 
characteristics (e.g., jurisdiction size). Other sensitivity tests include measuring the 
impact on arrests rather than reported crimes, as well as various iterations of the model 
based on exclusions of outliers and highly imputed jurisdictions. The following section 





CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 This chapter discusses results of the analysis strategy discussed in Chapter 3. A 
description of the demographic characteristics of the jurisdictions in the sample is 
presented first. This is followed by a detailed discussion of missing data in the dependent 
variable and the imputation strategy used to estimate crime and arrest totals for partial 
and non-reporting agencies. Results are presented for the main research question 
regarding the impact of drug court on specific violent and property crime rates. 
Sensitivity analyses are presented, involving the use of alternative dependent variables 
(arrest rates for specific type of violent, property, and drug crimes), whether the impact 
differs by jurisdiction size, and by removing jurisdictions with highly imputed crime and 
arrest information. 
Description of Jurisdictions 
 The sample consists of 63 unique jurisdictions, including 54 counties and 9 cities. 
Six of the 9 cities in the sample represent county equivalents (i.e., the city is the county) 
with the other three cities (Oakland, CA, Bismark, ND, and Syracuse, NY) serving as 
county seats within their respective counties (Alameda, Burleigh, and Onondaga). 
Control variable information was collected at the county level and thus overestimates 
demographics in the three cities that serve as county seats. The remaining 60 jurisdictions 
have geographically identical control and dependent variable information. 
 Descriptive statistics for this non-random sample of drug court jurisdictions are 
shown in Table 3. The sample includes four of the ten largest population counties 
nationwide (Maricopa County, Los Angeles County, Orange County, and Dallas County). 




within their state. Examination of the sample indicates that eight jurisdictions have 
average populations of less than 100,000 people. Table 3 presents the summary statistics 
of the sample for all control and dependent variables. The sample mean represents the 
average value for each variable across jurisdiction and time (N=1197). Since these panel 
data involve a time component, the range presented in Table 3 represents the range in 
average values across jurisdiction. For example, the jurisdiction with the lowest average 
population over the 19-year period had an average population of 12,821 people (Iron 
County, MI). The jurisdiction with the highest average population over the 19-year period 
had an average population of 9.4 million people (Los Angeles County, CA). Column 5 in 
Table 3 represents the average standard deviation from the mean within each jurisdiction 
for each variable. For example, the average homicide rate for the sample was 7.13 
homicides per 100,000 people. The standard deviation represents the average deviation 
from each jurisdiction’s mean homicide rate over the 19-year time period (2.60). That is, 
this standard deviation offers information about how much the homicide rate changed for 
each jurisdiction between 1990 and 2008 and gives some insight into time-variance of the 
control and dependent variables.  
Table 3 indicates that jurisdictions in the sample vary by demographic indicators. 
The jurisdictions varied widely by race with some locations representing majority 
nonwhite populations (e.g., Prince George’s county, MD had an average nonwhite 
population of 71% over the time period) and some representing majority white 
populations (e.g., Rutland County, VT was 2% nonwhite on average). The average 
proportion of youth aged 15-24 within each jurisdiction deviated by an average of only 




population of 0.09 (9%) and a maximum of 0.33 (33%). Per capita income averaged 
approximately $38,856 over the time period with jurisdictional averages ranging from 
$26,546 to $60,980
4
. The average unemployment rate for the sample was 5, ranging from 
2.49 for the jurisdiction with the lowest average unemployment rate and 9.75 for the 
jurisdiction with the highest. Overall, the sample primarily represents a geographically 
diverse set of primarily large metropolitan areas with age, race, and economic 
demographics consistent with national estimates for large metropolitan areas. 
A review of the drug court evaluations available for each jurisdiction offers 
insight into the types of offenders participating in the non-random sample of drug court 
programs represented in the current jurisdiction sample. Consistent with the national drug 
court surveys described in Chapter 2, most (81%) of the drug court programs in the 
sample exclude offenders with prior violent convictions, though some specified 
exceptions based on the type of violent crime involved (e.g., domestic violence charges) 
and how long ago the conviction occurred (e.g., more than 5 years ago). Also consistent 
with national surveys, nearly all of the programs in this sample required participants to 
have a substance use disorder and/or a long history of drug use.  
Most of the drug courts in the sample were felony courts, indicating the instant 
offense involved either drug-related felonies (excluding profit-generating drug 
trafficking) or felonies for property crimes (e.g., theft or forgery). The drug courts varied 
widely in the approximate number of active participants and admissions to the court each 
year. Consistent with Rossman et al.’s (2011) survey of adult drug courts, about 35% of 
the drug courts in the current sample of jurisdictions have the capacity to serve 
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 Per capita income was adjusted for inflation using 2008 dollars to eliminate substantial overestimates of 
income growth due to inflation occurring between 1990 and 2008.  Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation 




approximately 50 active participants, with an average yearly participant population of 
117 people.
5
 Based on this information, the jurisdictions in this sample likely impact non-
violent drug-involved offenders in need of drug treatment that have multiple prior 
convictions for drug and property crime. Though a summary measure of offender risk is 
not available, the offenders in this sample likely include those considered high risk for 
failure on standard supervision, thus characteristic of the type of offenders drug courts are 
designed to serve. 
 Of particular interest for the fixed effects analysis involves examination of the 
variability within each of the control variables. Standard control variables for crime 
estimates include population characteristics that are correlated with crime: youthfulness 
(represented by the proportion of the population comprised of the age of individuals most 
likely to commit crimes: 15-24 year olds), race, unemployment, and income. These 
population characteristics are only necessary to include in the fixed effects analysis if 
they are found to significantly vary within jurisdiction over time because this variation is 
not absorbed by the fixed effects estimator.  
Table 3 presents average standard deviation representing how much variability 
exists, on average, within each jurisdiction for each variable. Though the average youth 
population between jurisdictions ranges widely (0.09 to 0.31), the average within-
jurisdiction dispersion is relatively low (0.01). To identify whether each control variable 
varied significantly over time, each were regressed against indicator variables 
representing each year in the analysis. Results indicated that per capita income, 
unemployment rate, and proportion nonwhite significantly varied over time but the 
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variable representing the proportion of youth aged 15-24 in the population did not. Zero-
order correlations with the dependent variables also revealed a lack of significant 
relationship between the youthful population and these crime and arrest measures. Since 
only time-variant control variables that are correlated with the dependent variable are 
appropriate for fixed-effects analysis, the youth population variable was not included in 
the final models. 
Further investigation of the sample jurisdictions uses a class of algorithms called 
blocked adaptive computationally efficient outlier nominations developed by Billor, 
Hadi, and Velleman (2000) to identify jurisdictions that may affect the estimation of drug 
court implementation on crime and arrest rates. This process uses iterative steps of groups 
of observations to identify those in the sample that deviate substantially from the 
majority. This approach confirmed that the eight small jurisdictions were significant 
outliers in the sample for dependent variables involving violent crimes. Additionally, two 
other jurisdictions were found as outliers in the analysis of homicide rate: Monroe 
County, IN and Harford County, MD. The average population of these two jurisdictions 
were also relatively small, with Monroe County averaging approximately 120,000 people 
and Harford County averaging 217,000 people over the 19 year sample period. This 
contributed to lack of variation in the dependent variables relative to the dispersion found 
in the rest of the jurisdictions. For this reason the eight small jurisdictions were excluded 
from analyses of crime and arrests involving rape and robbery, and the 10 outlier 
jurisdictions were excluded from the analysis of crime and arrests involving homicide. 
These jurisdictions were not flagged as outliers for the analysis of the other dependent 




dependent variables (with the additional two removed from the homicide models) was 
performed to identify if these small jurisdictions were affecting the models. The results 
for all sensitivity tests are presented later in this chapter. 
 
Description of Missing Data 
 The data for this analysis include yearly crime and control variable information 
for 63 adult drug court jurisdictions from 1990 to 2008. For the dependent variables, each 
jurisdiction represents the sum total of specific types of reported crimes and arrests by 
reporting agency within that jurisdiction. Table 4 lists each jurisdiction, the number of 
reporting agencies (excluding zero population agencies and agencies covered by others in 
the jurisdiction), and the average proportion of reporting agencies with 10 to 12 months 
of missing data within each jurisdiction.  
It was necessary to assess the nature of zeros in the dependent variables to 
differentiate between whether the zero represented the actual absence of crime or the 
absence of a crime report by the reporting agency to the UCR program. To differentiate 
between these two, indicators were used based on the information provided in the 
documentation for the UCR Return A and Arrest files. For the UCR Arrest file, there is 
an indicator variable coded as 1 if the agency “reported no data.” For agencies with this 
indicator turned on, zero values in arrest and reported crimes variables were converted to 
missing. For the UCR Return A, the difference between true zeros and zeros representing 
missing data relied on missing data in the variable that records the date that the monthly 
report was last updated. When an agency does not report crime information for a given 




the two-digit month, day, and year of the report. If zeros were present in this variable for 
a reporting agency in a given month and year, the reported crime data was recorded as 
missing rather than zero. The remaining agencies with zero values in the reported crime 
and arrest variables were assumed to be true zeros rather than zeros due to missing data. 
 The jurisdictions within the sample vary widely by the number of agencies that 
report information to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (Table 4). The average number of 
reporting agencies within each jurisdiction is 14 (SD=15.298), ranging from 1 to 89 
reporting agencies. Eight of the 63 locations in the sample are single-agency jurisdictions. 
To create a balanced dataset, variable information for all 19 years was collected for all 
jurisdictions, regardless of their drug court implementation date. This required an 
analysis of missing data for all jurisdictions over all 19 years, with particular focus on 
jurisdictions that were missing data from all of their reporting agencies for any given 
year. Of the single-agency jurisdictions, only Baltimore, MD and Oakland, CA were 
missing data that required imputation for non-reporting agencies. Baltimore was missing 
dependent variable information for 1999 and Oakland was missing data for 1995.  
 Jurisdictions varied by the proportion of reporting agencies that were missing 10-
12 months of data each year, requiring diagnostics by year and jurisdiction to study how 
this may influence the fixed effects analysis. The 10-month threshold defining an agency 
as a “non-reporting agency” was set by the FBI as the threshold that triggers imputation 
for non-reporting agencies rather than partial reporting agencies (this strategy is 
discussed in the “Imputation Strategy” subsection of this chapter). Approximately 14% of 
the reporting agencies in the sample were missing 10-12 months of data. Madison 




County, VT and Polk County, IA were missing data for all reporting agencies in 1997 
and 1991, respectively.  
A sensitivity analysis (discussed in a later subsection of the this chapter) explores 
whether the results for this study differ significantly when the five jurisdictions with 
highly imputed data for at least one year (Baltimore, MD; Oakland, CA; Madison 
County, IL; Rutland County, VT; and Polk County, IA) are excluded from the sample.  
 
Imputation Strategy  
 Missing data in the sample were imputed using the strategy the FBI uses to 
impute the UCR for their annual publications. This strategy differs based on how many 
months the reporting agency reported data each year (Maltz, 1999). If an agency is 
missing less than 10 months of data, the average value in the non-missing months was 
applied to the missing months. If an agency is missing 10 to 12 months of data, the 
imputation strategy involves estimating values based on the crime rate for fully reported 
agencies within the population group and metropolitan status of the reporting agency with 
missing data. For example, the dependent variable estimates for an agency missing 10-12 
months of data reflect the crime rate of reporting agencies of the same population size 
(e.g., cities with populations 10,000 – 25,000) within the same state. If there are no 
comparable fully-reported agencies in the same state, geographic region is used (eg., 
Southwestern United States, Mid-Atlantic states).  
 Contention over using the FBI’s imputation strategy exists primarily for studies 
that analyze these data monthly or for small locales. The shortcomings of this approach 




1999). Scholars have developed sophisticated strategies that offer more precise monthly 
estimates of UCR data that the FBI’s imputation strategy is not able to achieve (Maltz, 
Roberts, & Stasny, 2006; Targonski, 2001; Lavalle, Haas, Turley, & Nolan, 2013). 
However, the intended purpose of the UCR was to provide annual national estimates of 
crime in the United States. The relatively simple imputation method used by the FBI 
since 1958 is precise enough to provide such estimates (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008).  
Lavalle, et al. (2013) offer a comparison of imputation strategies for partial and 
non-reporting agencies in West Virginia. They found that for partial reporting agencies 
the FBI method did not achieve significantly different estimates than two of the three 
other imputation methods used. Alternative imputation strategies involved calculating 
averages of a subdivision of months nearby the missing month, rather than using reported 
data for the full year to fill in the missing information. For non-reporting agencies, the 
authors found that regression-based imputation strategies performed better at the agency 
level, but did not differ significantly from the FBI method when scaled up to larger 
jurisdictions or when the level of missing data exceeded 50% over a given time period. 
The overall conclusion regarding use of imputation for UCR data indicates that any 
imputation strategy is better than doing nothing (Lavalle, et al., 2013).  
The current analysis of UCR crime data uses the FBI’s imputation strategy for 
two reasons. First, annual data are less likely to be affected by the pitfalls of imputation 
strategies (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008). The unit of analysis in this sample is annual crime and 
arrest information and uses fixed effects to identify whether changes in these annual 
totals are related to drug court implementation within a given year. Second, most of the 




average of 14 reporting agencies. The reliability of the imputation strategy is 
strengthened given the multiple agencies that capture crime information within each 
jurisdiction, especially considering the fact that most missing data come from smaller 
jurisdictions rather than county seats (Maltz, 1999). This means that agencies most likely 
to report are those that are also most likely to report most of the crime or arrest 
information for larger geographic jurisdictions (e.g., counties). Therefore, the imputation 
used for non-reporting agencies within the sample is likely to be minimally impactful of 
the larger jurisdictional estimates of crime within each location. A sensitivity analysis of 
the effect of including or excluding highly imputed jurisdictions is presented later in a 
subsection of this chapter. 
 
Analytic Model Diagnostics 
 A panel fixed effects model is used to analyze these jurisdiction-year panel data to 
identify whether a change within a jurisdiction (in this case drug court implementation) is 
related to a change in the crime or arrest rate. The fixed effect that is being controlled 
here is the time invariant unobserved factors contributing to higher crime rates in some 
jurisdictions and lower crime rates in other jurisdictions (e.g., geographic location). 
Unobserved heterogeneity across time that affected all jurisdictions is also captured in 
this model (e.g., general downward trend in crime over time). The strength of this 
approach lies in the ability to remove these unobservable characteristics and isolate the 
relationship of primary interest (drug court implementation and crime/arrest rates). 
However, it is still necessary to develop a model that is robust to the pitfalls of linear 




dependence). This required investigation of the model using statistical tests that 
specifically address whether these concerns are present. 
 Post-estimation tests determined that all three problems were present. 
Heteroskedasticity biases standard errors and could lead to erroneous inferences. A 
modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity indicated the presence of 
heteroskedastic error terms. Wooldridge’s F test for autocorrelation in panel data 
indicated first order correlation was present. Finally, Pesaran’s test of cross sectional 
independence indicated these data are cross-sectionally dependent (DeHoyos & Sarafidis, 
2006). That is, changes in one jurisdiction during a specific year were correlated with 
changes in another jurisdiction that same year. Ignoring cross-sectional dependence can 
severely bias standard errors (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). To account for all three sources of 
bias in standard errors, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are used. These errors are robust to 
cross-sectional and temporal dependence, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation 
(Hoechle, 2007). All dependent variables were log transformed to normalize skew found 
in the distribution of the error terms. Observations with zeros for specific types of crime 
or arrest rates (primarily found in homicide rates) were recoded with a very small 
constant (0.0000001) prior to log transformation to avoid missing values generated when 
log transforming zero values. 
 
Impact of Drug Court on Reported Crime  
 The impact of adult drug court implementation on specific types of reported crime 
is presented as Model 1 in Table 5. Holding time-variant jurisdictional demographics 




rate of reported homicide (0.344) and rape (0.450) in the second calendar year after the 
year the court was implemented. That is, implementing a drug court was associated with 
a 34.4% and 45% increase in the rate of reported homicide and rape, per 100,000 people 
within each jurisdiction. Drug court implementation was associated with significant 
decreases in two of the three property crimes, with a significant impact on burglary (-
0.091) and larceny (-0.026) but not motor vehicle theft (-0.037). The impact of drug court 
implementation on total crime was significant, with drug court implementation related to 
a 3.1% overall decrease in the crime rate. This was likely driven by the significant 
relationship between drug court and decreased property crime (0.046), with the 
coefficient estimating total violent crime impacts positive and non-significant (0.019). 
The substantial and unexpected impact of drug court implementation on homicide and 
rape required further investigation of the robustness of the model to rule out estimation 
errors that may have inflated these results.  
The previously discussed sensitivity analyses to check for an influence of outliers 
and highly imputed jurisdictions indicates the violent crime estimates presented in Model 
1 are inflated due to outlier jurisdictions. Model 2 in Table 5 presents crime estimates 
using the restricted sample of 55 jurisdictions, with an additional two jurisdictions 
removed as outliers in the homicide estimate. The significant relationship between drug 
court and rape disappears when outlier jurisdictions are excluded from the analysis, while 
the positive association between drug court implementation and increased reported 
homicide becomes negative and non-significant . Further, the estimated effect of drug 
court implementation on robbery rates becomes significant, indicating an average 




property crime between the two models indicates that while the effect on overall property 
crimes remains significant (-0.046), larceny is no longer significantly related to drug 
court implementation. The two model coefficients were also compared using Equation 2 
presented in Chapter 3. Though the outliers influence significance tests and magnitudes 
of the estimated effects, statistical comparison of coefficients across models revealed no 
significant differences. However, to provide the most conservative estimates of the 
impact of drug court on crime and arrest rates, Model 2 will be used for all further 
analyses of all dependent variables, including estimates regarding the impact of drug 
court on arrest. Table 6 provides the full estimated effect on crime rates for Model 2. 
To provide context, one is able to apply the results in Table 6 to any of the drug 
court jurisdictions using the known crime and arrest rates within given years. 
Hillsborough County implemented a drug court in 1994 and consisted of a total 
population of 893,438 people in 1996. Based on the estimation of the effect of drug court 
implementation on crime, drug court implementation was associated with decreases of 
282 robberies, 1,705 burglaries, 3,254 total property crimes, and an overall estimated 
decrease of 3,283 crimes.
6
 
 The time-variant control variables and overall goodness-of-fit of the model 
(within R
2
) also offer information about the estimated effects of changes in jurisdictional 
crime rates over time. Overall, the models for property crimes are more capable of 
explaining the average variance of the dependent variables within each jurisdiction than 
are the violent crime models. However, comparison of the confidence intervals 
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 calendar year after the drug court was implemented. For example, the total crime rate 
in Hillsborough in 1996 was 10,497 crimes per 100,000 people.  The equation to obtain the estimated 




surrounding the drug court coefficients for each dependent variable indicates overlapping 
magnitude of effect. That is, drug court implementation did not contribute to increases or 
reductions in any one specific type of crime above all others. The Per capita income (in 
thousands) and the variable for the unemployment rate had the expected effect on crime 
rates for most models, with increases in per capita income associated with decreases in 
crime rates and higher unemployment rates related to more crime.  
The variable representing the proportion of the nonwhite population in each 
jurisdiction had a strong negative association with crime rates. This finding was 
unexpected, but may be related to the nonrandom selection of the jurisdictions in the 
sample and immigration over the 19-year time period. The research regarding the 
relationship between race and crime indicates that most of this positive relationship is 
related to evidence that African Americans are more likely to be disproportionately 
involved with the criminal justice system (Sampson and Wilson, 1995). Recent studies of 
immigration and crime indicate that increases in Hispanic populations within 
communities are not associated with increased crime (Chalfin, 2014). Investigation of the 
jurisdictions by specific race and ethnicity indicates that the nonwhite population 
increases were driven by increases in populations of Hispanics. On average, the Hispanic 
population increased twofold in the jurisdictions from 1990 to 2008, with minimum 
percent increases around 40% in jurisdictions like Denver, CO, and locations in 
California that have historically high Hispanic populations. The largest increases in 
Hispanic populations were found in the south central United States, where jurisdictions 
like Jefferson County, KY and Shelby County, TN had Hispanic populations that 




average increases (28% and 57%, respectively) and American Indian/Alaskan Native 
populations experienced an average decrease in proportion of approximately 11% over 
the time period. It is likely that increases in nonwhite populations were measuring shifts 
in immigration within these mostly large metropolitan areas, rather than representing 
changes in the size of African American communities within jurisdictions over time that 
are most often associated with increased crime rates. 
 
Analysis of Arrests 
Table 7 shows the impact of drug court implementation on select drug, violent, 
and property arrest rates. Estimates of the control variables indicate similar patterns to 
those found in the estimates for reported crimes. Comparison of the R-squared statistic 
indicates that the power of the models estimating impacts on arrest is much lower than 
the explained variance of reported crimes. Except for homicide, drug court 
implementation was not significantly associated with arrests for any of the violent or 
property crime categories, though most coefficients indicated a negative relationship 
(arrests for vehicle theft was positive and non-signficant). An analysis of arrests for drug 
crimes indicates drug court implementation was associated with significant increases in 
arrest rates for all drug crimes (0.238) and for drugs other than marijuana (0.259). That is, 
drug court implementation was associated with a 23.8% increase in drug arrest rates, with 
a larger magnitude effect on drug arrests involving illicit drugs other than marijuana 
(25.9%). Using the contextual example presented previously for Hillsborough County, 
FL, drug court implementation is estimated to be associated with a decrease of 16 




other than marijuana. Possible explanations for why drug courts may be related to an 
uptick in drug arrests are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Analysis of Small Population Jurisdictions  
 The eight outlying jurisdictions were all jurisdictions with average populations of 
less than 100,000 people. This similarity across jurisdiction was used to examine the 
impact of drug court implementation on public safety for locations in which the drug 
court serves small communities. The jurisdictions in this analysis include: Kootenai 
County, ID; Wicomico County, MD; Barry County, MI; Iron County, MI; Bismarck, ND; 
Erie County, OH; Charlottesville, VA; and Rutland County, VT. Three of these eight 
jurisdictions were evaluated to effectively reduce recidivism: Wicomico County, MD; 
Barry County, MI; and Erie County, OH. Table 8 provides summary statistics for this 
small group of drug court jurisdictions. Compared to the full sample (Table 3), these 
jurisdictions represent small communities with an average population of approximately 
63,000 people. These jurisdictions had an average nonwhite population smaller than that 
for the full sample (.11 and .28, respectively). Crime and arrest rates were also lower in 
this sample compared to the full sample.  
 Column 6 in Table 8 indicates wide variability in the stability of the fixed effects 
model in providing estimates of crime and arrest impacts of the independent variable. The 
reported model F-statistic can only identify if there is strong evidence that the best fitting 
linear model has at least one predictor with a non-zero coefficient. The hypothesis testing 
whether one can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients equal zero can serve as a 




estimates of each predictor’s impact on the dependent variable. F-statistic values indicate 
a strong likelihood that the small jurisdiction sample does not provide enough variability 
in specific crime and arrest rates for a measurable effect to be detected and points to a 
general instability in estimates.  
The significant drug court coefficients among the stronger models were those 
measuring the impact of drug court implementation on summary violent (b=0.288, 
p<.05), property (b=0.247, p<.05), and total (b=0.209, p<.05) arrest rates. These results 
indicate marked increases in arrests two years after drug court implementation in small 
communities, but no significant impacts on reported crimes. These increases in arrests 
counter that of the findings for the full sample, and when statistically compared (using 
Equation 2), are significantly different from the non-significant decreases in arrests found 
when estimating the impact of drug court implementation on arrest rates using the full 
sample (N=55). Also of note are significant differences between the two samples in 
estimates of drug arrests. Estimation of the larger jurisdictions indicated that drug court 
implementation was associated with significant increases in drug arrests. Though not 
significant within the models (likely due to small sample size), the small jurisdiction 
coefficients for drug arrests were significantly different from the large jurisdiction 
estimates, representing an estimated decrease in drug arrests in the two years after drug 
court implementation. The small sample size prevents comparison of the small 







Sensitivity to Imputation 
The five jurisdictions that were found to have highly imputed data for one or more 
years were removed from the full sample and the restricted sample with outliers 
excluded. Neither test resulted in significant differences between any of the models or 
coefficients. This indicates that though some jurisdictions had highly imputed 
information for one or more years, the annual estimates were not affected by the amount 
of imputation imposed on the sample or for the number of years in which such imputation 
was necessary. This confirms the conclusions of others (e.g., Lynch & Jarvis, 2008; 
Lavalle, et al., 2013) that when used correctly, the FBI imputation strategy for annual 
crime and arrest estimates does not pose a significant threat to estimation procedures. 
 
Summary of Major Findings 
 The current analysis of the impact of drug court implementation on public safety 
indicates that drug courts have an overall public safety benefit with differential impacts 
on specific types of crime and arrests, and this impact may vary by type of court and 
community characteristics. Drug court implementation was associated with a 3.5% 
decrease in overall reported crime rates. Decreases in total property crime rates (4.6%) 
were largely driven by significant reductions in burglary rates (8.9%). Though robbery 
rates were also found to decrease (7.4%), non-significant associations with reductions in 
homicide and increases in rape and assault likely minimized the overall effect of drug 
court implementation on violent crime rates. An analysis of arrest rates indicated that 
although a non-significant reduction in homicide rates was found, actual arrest rates for 




jurisdiction (38%). The arrest analysis also revealed significant increases in drug arrests 
after drug court implementation, a finding that remained consistent when assessing the 
impact on drug arrests not involving marijuana. A sensitivity analysis of the eight small 
jurisdictions in the sample indicated a pattern of increases in violent and property arrests, 
but did not show the same increases in drug arrests found to be significant in the larger 






CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
 The main finding of the current study supports the conclusion that drug court 
implementation is related to overall reductions in crime. Specifically, the expectation that 
drug courts are better suited to impact property crimes was supported, however, the 
impact of drug court on violent crime remains tenuous. The analysis of drug arrests 
indicates increases in arrests for drug crimes, however that relationship does not hold true 
for small drug court jurisdictions serving average community populations of 100,000 or 
less. This chapter discusses the pattern of results with respect to variations in impact on 
specific types of crime, why drug courts may increase drug arrests, and offers a review of 
the limitations that temper this analysis and how future research can address them. 
The primary research question tested in the current study explored whether drug 
court implementation was associated with significant decreases in crime rates. The vast 
majority of evidence regarding the benefits of drug courts involves analysis of recidivism 
reductions of drug court programs and does not explore the potential aggregate impact 
that drug court may have on the communities in which they serve. Given the wide 
proliferation of drug court programs around the country, and the stated overarching goal 
of building healthy individuals, families and communities (NADCP, 2008), it is 
necessary to empirically address the aggregate impact of this alternative approach to 
treatment of drug-involved offenders in the criminal justice system. Exploring the 
potential benefits of drug courts is timely, given recent criticisms of the approach’s merits 






Results in Context: Criticisms of Drug Court 
Several national policy groups have recently published reports arguing that drug 
courts are not a good use of government funds to reduce drug use and crime. The Justice 
Policy Institute acknowledges that drug courts are a better alternative for drug offenders 
than incarceration, however the author argues that there are other options available to 
drug offenders that are potentially more impactful on public safety outcomes (Walsh, 
2011). Walsh cites a recent meta-analysis conducted by the Washington State Institute for 
Public Policy that, in part, examines the effectiveness of programs for drug-involved 
offenders for reducing recidivism (Drake, Aos, and Miller, 2009). Participation in 
intensive supervision programs that were treatment-oriented decreased recidivism by 
nearly 18% (based on 11 studies) while adult drug court programs reduced recidivism by 
8.7% (based on 57 studies). Walsh (2011) argues that this evidence indicates that 
addressing addiction for those involved with the justice system by using drug court is an 
inefficient use of resources given the benefits of other strategies. However, the author 
translates recidivism reduction to decreases in crime rates (increasing public safety) 
without an empirical understanding of how these programs may impact the aggregate.  
The Drug Policy Alliance contends that though drug courts adopt a disease model 
of addiction, the overuse of punitive responses to relapses does not represent a quality 
approach to addiction management. The report from the Drug Policy Alliance (2011) 
argues that drug court eligibility criteria is so restrictive that it screens out drug offenders 
that may pose a threat to the safety of persons or property, leaving only low level drug 
offenders unlikely to engage in serious crimes. This statement is echoed by a report from 




to “net-widening” of the criminal justice system by focusing on lower risk drug offenders 
that may be better served through a public health approach to drug addiction (NACDL, 
2009). Though these organizations do not discredit the effectiveness of drug courts for 
what they are, they do argue that drug courts are an inappropriate medium for 
substantially reducing drug use and crime within communities. 
While the current research cannot address criticisms related to whether drug 
courts impart the most efficient means by which to supervise and treat drug-involved 
offenders, it can inform questions about whether adoption of a drug court program within 
a community represents a step in the right direction. The current analysis of drug court 
jurisdictions found that implementation of a drug court reduces crime rates by an average 
of 3.5% two years after implementation of a court. This crime reduction was driven by 
significant reductions in burglary and robbery rates. A more consistent relationship exists 
between drug court implementation and property crime reductions, with an inconsistent 
pattern of findings for the violent crime and arrest variables contributing to a lack of 
evidence that drug court is related to overall violent crime patterns. 
 
Results in Context: Literature Contribution 
 This research adds to the very small body of literature regarding aggregate effects 
of drug court programs. Lilley (2013) measured the impact of receiving federal drug 
court grants on the same crime rate information used in the current analysis. However, 
Lilly’s primary conclusion was that receiving a federal drug court grant was related to 
increases in crime rates (primarily vehicle theft and rape). The author surmised that these 




drug court dropouts that may have occurred during the adoption of early drug courts in 
the mid-1990s. Though the current analysis found non-significant increases in vehicle 
theft and rape, his conclusion runs counter to the significant findings discussed in the 
current research.  
 Several reasons may explain the different results of these two bodies of work. 
First, Lilley’s analysis included more jurisdictions than the current analysis, perhaps 
providing a clearer picture of drug court impacts. The author’s sensitivity analysis of only 
drug court jurisdictions included drug courts that received federal drug court grants from 
1990 to 2002, generating an unbalanced dataset of approximately 129 drug courts.
7
 
Though there is likely overlap in jurisdictions between the two samples, is possible the 
current study of 63 primarily large drug court jurisdictions are fundamentally different 
from the jurisdictions included in the author’s analysis. Specifically, the author’s larger 
sample may include a higher proportion of smaller drug court jurisdictions, which may 
have biased his conclusions given the differences found between small and large 
jurisdictions in the current analysis. Further, the current analysis restricts the sample to 
evaluated drug courts, a characteristic that may separate this sample from a more 
inclusive sample of evaluated, non-evaluated, or evaluated jurisdictions but with negative 
findings. That is, the differences between the current research and Lilley’s analysis may 
be due to the characteristics of the drug courts includes within the respective sampling 
frames. 
Second, Lilley used receipt of drug court grants as the indicator for the 
implementation data of the drug court programs, potentially confounding the analysis. 
                                                             
7
 Based on the number of observations and years reported in the article (N=1680, 1990-2002), the lack of a 




The Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Discretionary Drug Court Grant Program offers 
grants to new drug courts as well as drug courts redeveloping their program. It is possible 
that receipt of the grant did not result in the actual implementation of the drug court, thus 
changing the nature of the time threshold by which drug courts are evaluated to impact 
dependent variables. The current analysis offers a different time threshold (calendar year 
in which the drug court program began) and thus contributes to knowledge about how 
and when drug courts may impart community-wide change.  
Finally, Lilley used a 1-year lag to identify changes in the crime rate related to 
drug court grants. This may not be enough time to assess marked changes in public safety 
due to drug court implementation because most of the first successful participants might 
not have completed the program yet, nor is it enough time to allow for community-wide 
changes to potentially take place. Despite the differences in results between the current 
analysis and Lilley’s (2013) analysis of drug court grant impacts, both works provide the 
first steps in identifying whether a widely-adopted criminal justice policy is producing 
community-level impacts in crime and arrest. 
 
Results in Context: Addressing Theoretical Mechanisms 
Chapter 2 developed two rationales whereby drug court implementation may 
impact crime rates. The first mechanism is indicative of a specific deterrent effect, 
indicating drug courts may impact crime through cumulative change in the offending 
patterns of the participants. Systematic reviews of drug court programs indicate a general 
focus on drug-addicted offenders in need of treatment that could benefit from consistent 




more intense programmatic impacts (Cullen & Gendreau, 2000) even if only offered to a 
small group of high-risk individuals (Jeglic, Maile, & Calkins-Mercado, 2011). The 
results presented in Chapter 4 indicate that drug court may be associated with public 
safety benefits because it is able to offer the right services to the right group of people, 
but it is beyond the scope of the current research to truly identify the theoretical 
mechanism that may be driving changes in crime rates.  
The drug court literature shows that stronger drug court impacts are likely to be 
found in high fidelity courts (Shaffer, 2006), indicating that courts more effective in 
reducing recidivism are courts focused on a high-risk/high-need model program 
framework (Cullen & Gendreau, 2000). The current analysis included a limited sample of 
drug courts that, though Mitchell et al. (2012) found some to be ineffective at reducing 
recidivism, were not significantly different enough to make a strong comparison of 
“effective” and “ineffective” courts. To assess whether drug court implementation is 
associated with significant changes in public safety due to specific deterrence, future 
research would need to include in the sampling frame all drug court jurisdictions where 
some consistent measure of “effectiveness” is known and “ineffective” courts are truly 
different from “effective” courts on several measures that assess drug court quality. 
Alternatively, one could study all persons in the community and measure crime 
participation. If it was found that decreases in crime participation were attributable to the 
drug court participants, this would be evidence for a specific deterrence effect of drug 
court.  
Evidence from the current analysis may also indicate that drug court programs are 




recidivism reductions. The public safety benefit of drug court implementation may be 
related to broader community-wide change, linked not only to the specific deterrence of 
drug court participants but also to the strengthening of communities to which these courts 
may contribute. The peripheral impacts of drug courts discussed in Chapter 2 include 
reductions in the use of public assistance, decreases in family conflict, and increases in 
emotional support systems for drug court participants (Gottfredson, et al., 2005; Green & 
Rempel, 2012). This empirical analysis of the effects of drug court implementation points 
to significant benefits with regard to reductions in crime rates upon adoption of a drug 
court program.  
To provide a more complete test of whether this mechanism influences the 
relationship between drug court implementation and public safety, these peripheral 
indicators should also be measured to identify community-wide changes due to the ripple 
effect of drug courts. Similar to the example provided above, a study could measure 
peripheral impacts of drug court participation by including all persons in a community 
and measuring specific expected peripheral impacts of drug courts (e.g., participation in 
public assistance, decreases in generational detriments, decreases in use of public 
assistance, increased employment, etc.). If these peripheral impacts can be attributed to 
drug court participants, this would provide evidence for a community repair mechanism.  
Decreases in property crime, burglary, and robbery coincide with expectations 
that reducing recidivism for drug offenders would impart similar changes in aggregate 
crime rates. The drug-crime literature indicates drug-involved offenders are likely to 
engage in property crimes either as a symptom of their addiction (e.g., necessity because 




solution to maintaining the addiction (Gottfredson, et al., 2008). The evidence presented 
in the current analysis supports the notion that if participants in drug court programs are 
those offenders at high risk of engaging in income-generating crime and are in need of 
services and supervision in order to change their behavior, it would follow that 
implementing a drug court within the community may be potent enough to change 
behaviors of this high risk/high need group. The systemic explanation of the drug-crime 
connection (Goldstein, 1985) may explain the significant decrease in robbery rates found 
in the current analysis. Since a substantial number of drug users become involved in drug 
distribution as their drug using careers progress, removing them from that environment 
removes them from the systemic violence in which they may once have played a part. 
 
Results in Context: Impacts on Arrest 
The analysis of arrest rates with respect to drug court implementation offers only 
a cursory view of how drug court may impact drug markets. Drug court implementation 
was significantly related to increases in total drug arrests, with particular impacts on drug 
arrests involving drugs other than marijuana. However, analysis of smaller communities 
did not produce the same increases in drug arrests, but rather non-significant decreases in 
both drug arrest measures. Smaller jurisdictions were found to have significant increases 
in property, violent, and overall arrest rates after drug court implementation, but these 
increases were not found in large jurisdictions. Further, arrests for homicide were 
significantly reduced in the larger jurisdiction sample.  
The findings regarding drug court impacts on arrests may be indicators for 




representing good indicators of actual offender behavior. The introduction of a drug court 
likely coincides with a jurisdictional focus on illicit drug markets within the community. 
This focus may involve introduction of a drug court as a part of a deeper parallel strategy 
involving police focusing on getting drug-involved offenders into drug court to more 
adequately address the “revolving-door” of the criminal justice system (Tiger, 2012). An 
assessment of the first ten years of drug court implementation indicated that criminal 
justice professionals at all levels regarded the adoption of a drug court the means by 
which the jurisdiction could more accurately address substance use (Drug Court 
Clearinghouse, 1998). Further, the dynamic nature of drug market cycles indicates that 
the expectation that drug courts would be able to prevent community-wide involvement 
in illicit drugs (indicative of a decrease in arrests) is relatively low. Law enforcement 
strategies in dealing with drug markets are the most impactful in diverting emerging drug 
markets and as harm reduction agents by being the most likely change agent for getting 
drug-involved offenders into treatment (Strang, Babor, Caulkins, et al., 2012).  
Increases in violent and property arrests found in small jurisdictions requires 
additional explanation. It is possible that small jurisdictions, representing a nonrandom 
set of mostly rural communities, are less embracing of the drug court model than large 
jurisdictions concerned with established drug markets as well as criminal justice case 
overload. Drug court implementation is often met with resistance by law enforcement 
entities due to a lack of collaboration or buy-in during the establishment of the court 
(NADCP, 2003). It is possible that arrests for violent and property crimes in the sub-
sample of small jurisdictions analyzed were due in part to this lack of cohesiveness in 




However, more research on the nature of drug markets in small jurisdictions is needed for 
an empirical treatment of this hypothesis. 
 
Limitations 
There are several limitations of the current analysis that qualify the results as 
patterns needing empirical replication, rather than definitive proof of the public safety 
effects of drug court implementation. The current analysis can only be generalized to 
relatively large communities (with populations over 100,000 people) that are uniquely 
situated to produce methodologically strong evaluations of their drug court programs. 
The findings in the current analysis are based on a specific subset of drug court programs 
that restricts generalization beyond the sample of jurisdictions analyzed herein. This 
subset of jurisdictions with drug courts represent mostly large jurisdictions. All have 
relatively strong evaluation evidence of their effectiveness for reducing recidivism. The 
presence of a published evaluation may indicate that though some programs were deemed 
ineffective in Mitchell et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis, they may still represent the “cream 
of the crop” of active drug court programs across the nation. Therefore these findings are 
only generalizable to jurisdictions in the sample, representing large jurisdictions with 
common drug court characteristics that allowed for methodologically sound evaluation. 
The main constraint of this research is the lack of high quality evaluation 
evidence for drug court programs. Noted in the Mitchell et al. systematic review, the 
major limitation of understanding the effects of drug court programs is the relatively 
weak methodologies used in evaluating individual programs. Only three randomized-




of the literature includes quasi-experimental designs that often do not include comparison 
groups. Mitchell and colleagues isolated the drug court evaluations that were 
methodologically strong enough to identify effect sizes for recidivism, but very few 
evaluations discuss the impact drug court has on actual drug use. Given these limitations 
inherent within the drug court literature, this sample represents only 63 of the nearly 
3,000 jurisdictions in the United States (approximately 2.1% of drug courts), nearly all of 
which represent large metropolitan areas. The sample of small jurisdictions was not 
representative enough to allow for direct comparison of differences in drug court 
implementation effects that may be apparent for smaller communities. 
This analysis may suffer from missing data limitations that could have affected 
measurement of the dependent variable. The time span included in the current analysis 
includes 19 years for 63 jurisdictions with approximately 13% of the reporting agencies 
in the sample missing 10-12 months of data. Data were imputed using the FBI imputation 
strategy in order to develop a strongly balanced dataset. This strategy can be problematic 
because it hides distinct changes that may have occurred during missing time periods. 
However, imputation methods are capable of providing good estimates of annual crime 
data when done appropriately (Fox & Swatt, 2008; Haas et al., 2012; Lynch & Jarvis, 
2008).  
For the current analysis, monthly crime and arrest information of all the reporting 
agencies for each jurisdiction was explored to diagnose the extent of missing data in the 
sample and imputation was used to approximate annual crime and arrest totals for 
locations that required this estimation procedure. Nearly every jurisdiction needed some 




imputation in cases where reporting agencies were missing more than nine months of 
information. Sensitivity analyses concluded that dropping the most problematic 
jurisdictions from the sample did not significantly change the results. Though this 
provides confidence in the inferences drawn from these data, the potential error in 
drawing conclusions remains present. Future research can expand this analysis to other 
jurisdictions in order to provide further confidence in these results. 
This analysis may suffer from two additional data limitations. First, a relatively 
small sample size when trying to detect differences in crime and arrest estimates with 
respect to sub-groups of jurisdictions likely masked detection of a more precise 
measurement of association between the dependent and independent variables. The low 
statistical power of assessing changes in the dependent variables for the sub-sample of 
small jurisdictions only allowed for a superficial view of the impact of drug court 
implementation in these kinds of communities. Further, it prevented full direct 
comparison of the impact of drug courts that might differentially occur in small and large 
metropolitan areas.  
Another data limitation involves the possibility that the regression models 
mischaracterized the relationship between drug court and public safety. Although this 
analysis attempts to identify the relationship using sophisticated statistical techniques and 
by appropriately controlling for other time-variant observables impacting the dependent 
variables, it is possible there are other hidden elements acting in tandem with drug court 
implementation that are driving the effects. That is, drug court implementation may be 
only a part of a systematic change wherein other elements may be driving changes in 




analysis. These other factors were not controlled in the model and thus represent possible 
error due to omitted-variable bias. The structure of local criminal justice systems would 
require specific analysis of each jurisdiction to fully understand whether hidden elements 
may be acting as change agents influencing the measurable relationship between drug 
court and public safety. Though such an analysis was beyond the scope of the current 
study, fully identifying the direct relationship between drug court and public safety would 
involve a deeper analysis of each jurisdiction to rule out a common pattern of other 
influencers. 
The extreme variability of drug court programming, between programs and within 
programs over time, represents a challenge related to isolating the effect of a policy that 
is essentially a “moving target.” This analysis loosely defined drug court jurisdictions as 
communities (counties or cities) that implemented an alternative court and sentencing 
structure for certain kinds of adult drug or drug-involved offenders that departed from the 
traditional method of processing such offenders within the criminal justice system. Each 
drug court jurisdiction had been evaluated for their impact on recidivism and largely 
consisted of a structure similar to that which is outlined in the NADCP key components 
of drug courts. Therefore this analysis is only capable of determining whether this loose 
general structure of drug court is related to crime and arrest rates and is incapable of 
addressing nuances within or between courts that may be more or less related to the 
outcomes of interest. Such nuances include the type of drug markets most present within 
the community, the collaborative nature of the drug court, and the specific inclusion 





Implications for Policy 
 The current analysis of drug court implementation on public safety offers several 
implications for criminal justice policy. Findings suggest that drug court implementation 
is related to overall decreases in crime rates, giving support for the adoption of this 
program by large metropolitan areas concerned with identifying ways to handle illicit 
substance use disorders among the offender population. These findings are more tenuous 
for jurisdictions with small populations and thus more research needs to explore the 
relationship between drug court and public safety before stronger conclusions can be 
made about the potential impact this criminal justice program may have in smaller 
communities. 
 Recent research has demonstrated that the possible impact of drug court programs 
may be constrained by the restrictive eligibility criteria inherent to most courts that 
prevent them from serving violent offenders or a larger base of offenders with substance 
use disorders. The current research offers support for the conclusion that drug courts may 
be serving enough drug-involved offenders to provide a public safety impact in the 
surrounding community. These results provide support for measured relaxation of 
inclusion criteria with continued monitoring of public safety impacts. Relaxing inclusion 
criteria to include a wider base of drug-involved offenders may have the drawback of 
diluting programming if the relaxation is not also met with increased resources for the 








 This analysis of the impact of drug court implementation on public safety 
represents a first step in understanding whether this criminal justice program is capable of 
producing community-wide change. Drug court implementation in this constrained 
sample of primarily large jurisdictions was found to decrease overall crime rates, with 
particular reductions in burglary and robbery. A tenuous relationship between drug court 
and subsequent rates of violent crime, as well as an inconsistent pattern of results 
concerning arrests, requires further investigation of this important policy question. Future 
research can broaden the sample to include more jurisdictions and allow for specific 
investigation of large and small drug court jurisdictions as well as a comparison of 
effective and ineffective drug court programs. Exploration of other analytic methods 
involving different dependent variables or qualitative data analysis of other common 
variables temporally correlated with drug court implementation may be able to reconcile 
some of the questions generated by comparing the current analysis with Lilley (2013). 
Further study of the impact of drug courts based on program quality can also provide a 
deeper understanding of how drug courts may work as community agents of change. 
Drug courts represent one of the most widely adopted criminal justice program 
integrating treatment and supervision to address substance use among drug-involved 
offenders. It stands to reason that such wide acceptance of a criminal justice policy 
should be evaluated not only by the program’s ability to change individual offending 





TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Data source information and variables derived from them. 
 
Data Source Description 
Type of 
Variable Variables 
Mitchell, et al. (2012) Systematic review of 
92 drug court 
programs, of which 63 




FBI Uniform Crime 
Reports, Reported 
Crimes Master File 
(Return A), 1986-2008 
Monthly counts of 
actual crimes reported 
to police by reporting 
agency 
Dependent Homicide, rape, robbery, 
assault, burglary, larceny, 
motor vehicle theft 
FBI Uniform Crime 
Reports, Master Arrest 
File, 1986-2008 
Monthly counts of 
arrests reported to 
police by reporting 
agency 
Dependent Arrests for: homicide, 
rape, robbery, assault, 
burglary, larceny, motor 
vehicle theft, total drug, 
drugs excluding 
marijuana 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment 
Statistics Program 
County-level (by FIPS 
code) estimates of 
annual unemployment 
rate 
Control Unemployment rate 
Bureau of Economic 
Assistance, Local Area 
Personal Income 
County-level (by FIPS 
code) estimates of 
annual per capita 
income 
Control Per capita income 




County-level (by FIPS 
code) estimates of 
annual local area 
population 
demographics 
Control Percent nonwhite 












Table 2. Sample locations sorted by effectiveness in reducing recidivism based on 









Effective Courts (N = 39) 
Anchorage, AK 1999 1.82 
Los Angeles County, CA 1994 1.94 
Oakland, CA 1991 2.72 
Orange County, CA 1997 1.49 
Riverside County, CA 1996 2.20 
Santa Clara County, CA 1994 28.89 
Escambia County, FL 1993 5.27 
Hillsborough County, FL 1994 3.82 
Okaloosa County, FL 1993 3.38 
Ada County, ID 1998 4.32 
Madison County, IL 1996 1.76 
Monroe County, IN 1999 2.64 
St. Joseph County, IN 1997 2.57 
Vigo County, IN 1996 2.76 
Vanderburgh County, IN 2001 1.61 
Harford County, MD 1997 2.22 
Montgomery County, MD 2004 4.17 
Wicomico County, MD 2005 4.06 
Baltimore, MD 1994 1.79 
Barry County, MI 2001 3.13 
Kalamazoo County, MI 1997 1.87 
Oakland County, MI 2001 1.89 
Douglas County, NE 1997 2.77 
Clark County, NV 1992 1.74 
Rochester, NY 1995 1.58 
Suffolk County, NY 1996 2.99 
Syracuse, NY 1997 2.11 
Erie County, OH 1996 4.41 
Hamilton County, OH 1995 1.64 
Summit County, OH 1995 1.84 
Multnomah County, OR 2002 1.99 
Marion County, OR 2001 2.88 
Lancaster County, PA 2005 3.39 
Shelby County, TN 1997 13.75 
Dallas County, TX 1998 2.66 
Travis County, TX 1993 3.57 
King County, WA 1994 2.50 
Pierce County, WA 1994 1.56 
Dane County, WI 1996 2.13 
  
Ineffective Courts (N = 24) 
Maricopa County, AZ 1992 1.13 










San Mateo County, CA 1995 1.08 
Ventura County, CA 2000 1.20 
Denver, CO 1994 1.06 
Broward County, FL 1991 0.71 
Polk County, IA 1996 1.43 
Kootenai County, ID 1998 1.58 
Jefferson County, KY 1992 1.46 
Suffolk County, MA 1999 1.05 
Howard County, MD 2004 1.97 
Prince George’s County, MD 2002 1.08 
Cumberland County, ME 1998 1.17 
Iron County, MI 2003 1.84 
Hennepin County, MN 1997 0.79 
Jackson County, MO 1993 2.36 
Bismarck, ND 2001 1.30 
Chester County, PA 1997 1.38 
Philadelphia, PA 1998 1.87 
Jefferson County, TX 1993 1.50 
Tarrant County, TX 1995 1.55 
Salt Lake County, UT 1996 0.75 
Charlottesville, VA 1997 0.34 













Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the sample (1990-2008). 













Dependent Variables     
Total Reported Crime Rate 6259.50 2244.95 12343.57 1152.40 
     Total Violent 1749.42 545.49 4662.12 387.22 
          Homicide Rate 7.13 1.56 43.09 2.60 
          Rape Rate 40.11 14.08 82.25 12.26 
          Robbery Rate 206.47 7.36 1079.19 82.35 
          Assault Rate 1495.71 510.35 3480.36 346.72 
     Total Property 4508.93 1460.70 8418.04 913.91 
          Burglary Rate 931.94 298.73 1994.12 253.40 
          Larceny Rate 3028.99 1072.66 5270.39 582.66 
          Vehicle Theft Rate 548.00 65.64 1494.57 186.39 
Total Arrests 1077.55 258.99 3195.54 291.98 
     Total Violent 591.19 178.60 2012.87 184.60 
          Homicide 5.48 0.54 37.65 3.38 
          Rape 9.48 2.50 27.01 5.43 
          Robbery 38.57 1.03 200.48 17.32 
          Assault 537.66 153.38 1903.44 174.36 
     Total Property 486.37 80.39 1182.67 137.75 
          Burglary 77.10 18.44 312.56 30.36 
          Larceny  368.39 56.76 899.09 108.54 
          Vehicle Theft 40.88 5.19 174.62 17.81 
     Total Drug 475.14 84.40 2926.05 194.71 
          Drugs Excluding Marijuana 304.44 26.82 2490.80 139.97 
Sample Descriptives     
     Population 840950.60 12821.47 9373569.00 115527.90 
Control Variables     
     Proportion Age 15-24 0.15 0.09 0.31 0.01 
     Proportion Nonwhite 0.28 0.02 0.71 0.05 
     Per-capita Income 38855.81 26546.03 60980.14 4110.12 
     Unemployment Rate 5.00 2.49 9.75 1.12 
N = 1,197 annual observations (63 jurisdictions) 
Minimum and Maximum Jurisdiction Mean refers to range in means by jurisdiction 
SD refers to the average deviation from jurisdiction average over time 










Table 4. Mean and range of reporting agencies and average percent of reporting agencies 
with 10-12 months of missing data each year over the study time period (1990-2008). 
 












Anchorage, AK  1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   0 
Maricopa Cty, AZ 19.74 
 (0.113) 
18 20   9.35 
Los Angeles Cty, CA 88.22 
 (0.301) 
85 89   0 
Monterey Cty, CA 13 
 (0.000) 
13 13   0 
Oakland, CA 1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   4.35 
Orange Cty, CA 32.13 
 (0.567) 
27 35   0 
Riverside Cty, CA 23.74 
 (1.058) 
14 27   4.76 
San Mateo Cty, CA 22.35 
 (0.264) 
20 23 10.21 
Santa Clara Cty, CA 16.48 
 (0.106) 
16 17   2.81 
Ventura Cty, CA 10.96 
 (0.043) 
10 11   0 
Denver, CO   1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   0 
Broward Cty, FL 29.65 
 (0.162) 
28 31 10.29 
Dade Cty, FL 28.74 
 (0.446) 
26 31   9.98 
Escambia Cty, FL   3 
 (0.000) 
  3   3 27.54 
Hillsborough Cty, FL   4 
 (0.000) 
  4   4   6.52 
Okaloosa Cty, FL   7.70 
 (0.277) 
  5   9 31.68 
Polk Cty, IA 10.30 
 (0.098) 
10 11   5.61 
Ada Cty, ID   4.78 
 (0.088) 
  4   5 15.65 
Kootenai Cty, ID   5.35 
 (0.264) 
  3   6 24.64 
Madison Cty, IL 20.26 
 (0.261) 
18 21 68.36 
Monroe Cty, IN   2 
 (0.000) 
















St. Joseph Cty, IN   3.96 
 (0.277) 
  3   6 11.38 
Vanderburgh Cty, IN   2 
 (0.000) 
  2   2   0 
Vigo Cty, IN   3 
 (0.000) 
  3   3 33.33 
Jefferson Cty, KY 16.26 
 (0.538) 
11 18 44.80 
Suffolk Cty, MA   4 
 (0.000) 
  4   4 20.65 
Baltimore, MD   1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   4.35 
Harford Cty, MD   4 
 (0.000) 
  4   4   0 
Howard Cty, MD   1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   0 
Montgomery Cty, MD   4.96 
 (0.285) 
  2   6 44.78 
Prince George's Cty, MD 23.26 
 (0.309) 
19 24 13.10 
Wicomico Cty, MD   4 
 (0.000) 
  4   4   0 
Cumberland Cty, ME 15.70 
 (0.132) 
14 16   9.24 
Barry Cty, MI   6.96 
 (0.172) 
  6   8 24.38 
Iron Cty, MI   6.35 
 (0.264) 
  4   7 34.78 
Kalamazoo Cty, MI 12.78 
 (0.088) 
12 13 23.16 
Oakland Cty, MI 44.04 
 (0.347) 
41 45   7.96 
Hennepin Cty, MN 33.78 
 (0.088) 
33 34   5.63 
Jackson Cty, MO 12.74 
 (0.328) 
11 15   8.49 
Bismark, ND   2.26 
 (0.094) 
  2   3   0 
Douglas Cty, NE   6.96  
 (0.239) 
  5   8 27.10 
Clark Cty, NV   4.78 
 (0.088) 
  4   5   4.78 
Rochester, NY   1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   0 
Suffolk Cty, NY 28.83 
 (0.879) 
















Syracuse, NY   1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   0 
Erie Cty, OH   4.39 
 (0.104) 
  4   5   8.91 
Hamilton Cty, OH 38.65 
 (0.312) 
36 40 27.90 
Summit Cty, OH 22.52 
 (0.474) 
19 25 32.83 
Marion Cty, OR 14.57 
 (0.176) 
13 15 17.32 
Multnomah Cty, OR   4.39 
 (0.104) 
  4   5   0 
Chester Cty, PA 38.65 
 (0.938) 
29 42 18.40 
Lancaster Cty, PA 44.26 
 (0.706) 
37 46 16.11 
Philadelphia, PA   1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   0 
Shelby Cty, TN   6 
 (0.000) 
  6   6   4.35 
Dallas Cty, TX 23.91 
 (0.060) 
23 24   0 
Jefferson Cty, TX   6.78 
 (0.208) 
  6   8   9.78 
Tarrant Cty, TX 32.70 
 (0.098) 
32 33   0.14 
Travis Cty, TX 10.74 
 (0.113) 
  9 11   5.14 
Salt Lake Cty, UT 12.26 
 (0.261) 
10 13 19.51 
Charlottesville, VA   1 
 (0.000) 
  1   1   0 
Rutland Cty, VT   6.09 
 (0.259) 
  4   7 27.74 
King Cty, WA 32.13 
 (1.173) 
23 37   5.49 
Pierce Cty, WA 17.87 
 (0.418) 
16 20 16.25 
Dane Cty, WI 20.61 
 (0.852) 















Total Crime -0.031** -0.035* 
 (0.011) (0.013) 
     Total Violent Crime  0.019 -0.008 
 (0.024) (0.020) 
          Homicide
1 
 0.344* -0.057 
 (0.148) (0.037) 
          Rape  0.450*  0.401 
 (0.208) (0.268) 
          Robbery -0.077 -0.074** 
 (0.047) (0.026) 
          Assault  0.035  0.008 
 (0.023) (0.019) 
     Total Property Crime -0.051*** -0.046** 
 (0.011) (0.016) 
          Burglary -0.091*** -0.089** 
 (0.026) (0.032) 
          Larceny -0.026** -0.017 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
          Vehicle Theft -0.037 -0.041 
 (0.022) (0.036) 
Total Arrests  0.010 -0.022 
 (0.034) (0.029) 
     Total Drug Arrests  0.234*  0.238* 
           (0.091) (0.095) 
          Excluding Marijuana  0.266*  0.259* 
 (0.122) (0.126) 
     Total Violent Arrests  0.025 -0.017 
 (0.043) (0.041) 
          Homicide -0.244 -0.291** 
 (0.201) (0.101) 
          Rape  0.055 -0.076 
 (0.168) (0.096) 
          Robbery  0.403 -0.029 
 (0.247) (0.034) 
          Assault  0.035 -0.009 
 (0.047) (0.044) 
     Total Property Arrests  0.007 -0.031 
 (0.032) (0.025) 
          Burglary -0.035 -0.067 
 (0.039) (0.037) 
          Larceny  0.084 -0.018 
 (0.073) (0.033) 
          Vehicle Theft  0.215  0.036 
 (0.134) (0.072) 
N observations (jurisdictions) 1197 (63) 1045 (55) 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  
1
Homicide was estimated using a restricted sample of 53 jurisdictions (n=1,007) 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses. All dependent variables are log transformed.
 














Drug Court  -0.057  0.401 -0.074**  0.008 -0.089** -0.017 -0.041 -0.008 -0.046** -0.035* 
 (0.037) (0.268) (0.026) (0.019) (0.032) (0.012) (0.036) (0.020) (0.016)  0.013 
Nonwhite -1.435*** -5.042* -1.639*** -0.667*** -1.866*** -1.647*** -1.522*** -0.917*** -1.607*** -1.398*** 
 (0.322) (2.263) (0.400) (0.174) (0.368) (0.117) (0.387) (0.141) (0.170)  0.130 
Unemploy  0.036* -0.038  0.053**  0.003  0.054***  0.024***  0.025  0.012  0.031***  0.027*** 
 (0.016) (0.030) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.017) (0.008) (0.006)  0.005 
Income -0.016* -0.006  0.0001 -0.006* -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.005 -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  0.002 
Constant
 
 2.679***  5.045***  5.372***  7.646***  7.607***  8.871***  6.902***  7.795***  9.200***  9.407*** 
 (0.236) (0.522) (0.256) (0.174) (0.161) (0.082) (0.166) (0.175) (0.084)  0.099 
Within R
2
  0.190  0.008  0.271  0.057  0.618  0.590  0.236  0.116  0.634  0.553 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.   
1
Homicide was estimated using a restricted sample of 53 jurisdictions (n=1,007) due to two additional outliers. 
N = 1,045 annual observations (55 jurisdictions) 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses. Jurisdictions and year fixed effects were also included. All dependent variables are log transformed.  Per 
































Drug Court  -0.384** -0.076 -0.029 -0.009 -0.067 -0.018  0.036  0.238*  0.259* 
 (0.139) (0.096) (0.034) (0.044) (0.037) (0.033) (0.072) (0.095) (0.126) 
Nonwhite  0.336 -3.587*** -2.038** -0.401 -1.527*** -1.597** -1.684* -1.165** -2.418*** 
 (1.189) (0.333) (0.678) (0.245) (0.336) (0.487) (0.678) (0.374) (0.610) 
Unemploy  -0.026 -0.021  0.036 -0.054***  0.031  0.016 -0.024 -0.046** -0.015 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) 
Income -0.031* -0.028***  0.001 -0.014*** -0.014* -0.023*** -0.015*  0.007  0.009 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Constant  2.829***  4.290***  3.904***  7.078***  5.123***  7.147***  4.679***  6.146***  5.701*** 
 (0.524) (0.210) (0.309) (0.187) (0.307) (0.109) (0.220) (0.171) (0.271) 
Within R
2
  0.051  0.170  0.111  0.086  0.226  0.290  0.066  0.087  0.018 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.   
1
Homicide was estimated using a restricted sample of 53 jurisdictions (n=1,007) due to two additional outliers. 
N = 1,045 annual observations (55 jurisdictions)  
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parentheses. Jurisdiction and year fixed effects were also included. All dependent variables were log 
transformed.   





Table 8. Descriptive statistics for the outlier sample (1990-2008). 















Dependent Variables      
Total Reported Crime Rate 4796.89 2244.95 7958.72 657.73   2.23 
     Total Violent 1398.43 545.49 2726.31 329.21 59.42*** 
          Homicide Rate 3.23 1.85 7.87 2.98     6.42* 
          Rape Rate 33.90 15.61 57.90 14.79   1.46 
          Robbery Rate 64.94 7.36 191.91 17.27   1.34 
          Assault Rate 1296.37 510.35 2468.63 323.67 54.79*** 
     Total Property 3400.56 1460.70 5226.86 636.95 25.61*** 
          Burglary Rate 642.78 298.73 1004.78 142.30 35.71*** 
          Larceny Rate 2587.83 1096.34 4139.67 525.23     13.24** 
          Vehicle Theft Rate 169.94 65.64 334.33 37.34   1.39 
Total Arrests 937.65 258.99 1838.12 275.78     6.35* 
     Total Violent 553.04 178.60 1349.35 197.25 25.37*** 
          Homicide 2.99 0.54 6.40 3.23   3.99 
          Rape 10.32 4.68 22.93 6.57   1.97 
          Robbery 19.19 1.03 56.31 9.39       8.64** 
          Assault 520.53 171.05 1300.47 193.85 20.31*** 
     Total Property 384.61 80.39 749.08 116.84     11.00** 
          Burglary 62.24 18.44 144.01 23.77     11.49** 
          Larceny  303.62 56.76 566.85 100.30   1.71 
          Vehicle Theft 18.75 5.19 51.30 10.04       7.95** 
     Total Drug 318.90 84.40 762.73 161.43 55.33*** 
          Excluding Marijuana 163.44 26.82 337.40 93.42     13.58** 
Sample Descriptives      
     Population 63228.41 12821.47 104172.7 7792.46  
Control Variables      
     Proportion Age 15-24 0.15 0.09 0.27 0.02  
     Proportion Nonwhite 0.11 0.02 0.30 0.02  
     Per-capita Income 32906.94 26546.03 41184.85 3268.01  
     Unemployment Rate 5.27 3.03 8.12 1.28  
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.   
N = 152 annual observations (8 jurisdictions) 
Minimum and Maximum Jurisdiction Mean refers to range in means by jurisdiction 
SD refers to the average deviation from jurisdiction average over time 
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